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BE FRUITFUL AND MULTIPLY, BY OTHER MEANS,
IF NECESSARY: THE TIME HAS COME TO
RECOGNIZE AND ENFORCE GESTATIONAL
SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
Paul G. Arshagouni*
INTRODUCTION
Surrogacy, the practice of carrying a child to term for the benefit of
someone else, has been with us since before recorded history. One of
the earliest surrogates was none other than Zeus, king of the Olym-
pian gods. Athena burst forth from his head after Zeus had swal-
lowed Metis, Athena's pregnant mother, whole.' Zeus more directly
served as the gestational surrogate for Dionysus, the god of wine. As
Dionysus' pregnant mother, Semele (daughter of King Cadmus of
Thebes), died, Zeus snatched the developing fetus and sewed it into
his thigh. Zeus gave birth to the god of wine some time later.2 An-
other frequently cited early example, the story of Abraham, Sarah,
and Hagar, comes from Genesis.3 Unable to conceive a child, Sarah
offered her handmaiden Hagar to provide a child for Abraham. Ish-
mael was the result of that arrangement.
Surrogacy today has taken a somewhat different form than was
practiced by the Olympian gods or the figures from Genesis. Modern
medicine has developed a host of assisted reproductive technologies
(ART). The potential list includes hormonal therapies, artificial in-
semination, in vitro fertilization (IVF), pre-implantation genetic diag-
* M.D., J.D., M.P.H. Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University. The author
would like to thank the library staff at MSU College of Law, particularly Barbara Bean, as well
as others who have been so very helpful, including Steve Silva and Brent Domann. Most espe-
cially a thank you to Krisheena LaBranche, Cindy Hoang, and Beth Arshagouni, without whom
there would be no article.
1. Technically, Zeus was not acting as a surrogate. Metis continued to carry and give birth to
Athena while inside of Zeus' head. Nevertheless, Athena did, according to myth, spring forth
from within Zeus. See Nancy Conner, The Birth of Athena, NETPLACEs, http://www.netplaces.
com/classical-mythologylathena-the-peaceful-warrior/the-birth-of-athena.htm (last visited Aug.
3, 2011).
2. See Nancy Conner, The Twice-Born God, NETPLACES, http://www.netplaces.com/classical-
mythology/partying-with-dionysus/the-twice-born-god.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).
3. See Genesis 16.
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nosis, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and surrogacy.4 There are
others as well, and science may well bring even more possibilities to
fertility clinics in the years to come. Each of these technologies brings
its own discussion regarding the moral, ethical, and legal conse-
quences and complications. This Article discusses the legal status of
gestational surrogacy in the United States.
Today, the laws governing the use of gestational surrogacy vary
widely from state to state. This has led to a fractured market and
increased inefficiencies, and has resulted in significant inequities for
potential surrogates and the individuals seeking to utilize their ser-
vices. There is no clear majority approach to surrogacy. There is not
even a clear plurality approach. Some states permit and enforce a
wide range of surrogacy contracts. Some enforce only a limited subset
of such contracts. Many states have no law on the subject or refuse to
enforce surrogacy contracts. Three states not only refuse to enforce
surrogacy contracts, but impose civil or criminal penalties on those
arranging and entering into surrogacy contracts.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the technical process of sur-
rogacy.5 Part III discusses the various approaches states and legal or-
ganizations have taken or recommended regarding surrogacy.6 It also
discusses the positive and negative aspects of each approach. Part IV
discusses the major arguments in opposition to the enforcement of
gestational surrogacy agreements and why those arguments fall short.7
Part V argues that the current patchwork of laws creates more harm
than it resolves." Part VI concludes the Article and argues that the
time has come to take a more comprehensive approach that endorses,
but regulates, the use of gestational surrogacy agreements.9
II. WHAT EXACTLY Is SURROGACY?
Surrogacy is the use of one woman's gestational capacity to assist in
the development of a child intended for someone else to parent.'0 As
4. See generally AM. Soc'Y FOR REPROD. MED. (ASRM), http://www.asrm.org (last visited
Aug. 22, 2011); Soc'Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. (SART), http://www.sart.org (last visited
Aug. 22, 2011).
5. See infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 16-140 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 141-249 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
10. See ASRM, THIRD PARTY REPRODUCIlON (SPERM, EGG, AND EMBRYO DONATION AND
SURROGACY): A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 13 (2006), available at http://www.reproductivefacts.org/
uploadedFiles/ASRMContent/Resources/PatientResources/FactSheets.andInfoBooklets/
thirdparty.pdf.
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part of this arrangement, the woman carrying the child agrees to relin-
quish any parental claims that she may have regarding the resulting
child or children. The embryo is considered the child of the intended
parents." As learned in high school biology (or likely much earlier),
there are a number of necessary steps that precede the birth of a child.
One key step involves the joining of the male's sperm and the female's
egg. There is, of course, the most traditional method for encouraging
a sperm and an egg to fuse. This method, however, is unsuccessful for
some individuals who wish to have a child. In such situations, the fu-
sion of egg and sperm may be encouraged outside of a woman's body
through IVF. Physicians or medical technologists encourage the ga-
metes (the eggs and sperm) from the intended parents or donors to
join, forming a zygote. The zygote is then allowed to divide for three
to five days, forming into a small ball of cells called the blastocyst. At
this stage, the blastocyst is transferred to the surrogate's uterus in
hopes it will implant into the surrogate's uterine wall and pregnancy
will ensue.12
Surrogacy is divided into two categories: traditional and gestational.
Traditional surrogacy is like the situation from Genesis, where the sur-
rogate is also the genetic progenitor of the resulting baby. Gestational
surrogacy follows closer to the Zeus and Dionysus mythological situa-
tion, where the carrier of the child does not also provide the egg.13 In
short, traditional surrogacy is where the woman carrying the child is
also a genetic progenitor of the child, and gestational surrogacy is
where the woman carrying the child is not a genetic progenitor of the
child.
Intended parents choose their method of having children for vary-
ing reasons. Until the advent of modern medical practices, most par-
ticularly IVF, there were few choices available. Individuals wanting to
be parents had but two viable options: they could use the traditional
method or they could legally adopt a parentless child. Traditional sur-
rogacy was available prior to IVF; however, as a traditional surrogate
could only become pregnant through sexual intercourse or artificial
11. The terms "intended parent" or "intended parents" are used throughout this Article to
mean the individual or individuals who intend to become parents through the use of gestational
surrogacy. It should be made clear, however, that once the embryo is transferred to the gesta-
tional surrogate and implants into her uterus, the "intended parents" are the actual parents of
that embryo. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text. In this Article, embryo will be used
to encompass all stages of fetal development, including embryo, fetus, and resulting child.
12. For a more detailed description of the IVF and embryo transfer process, see A Patient's
Guide to Assisted Reproductive Technology, SART, http://www.sart.org/detail.aspx?id=4020 (last
visited July 27, 2011).
13. An argument can be made that Zeus was also a traditional surrogate because he was the
genetic father. Nonetheless, the analogy is close.
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insemination,14 this was not a common option. Today, if the tradi-
tional approach does not result in a child, intended parents may use a
variety of fertility-enhancing drugs, utilize IVF and embryo transfer,
employ the services of a surrogate, or adopt. If someone wishes to
have a child genetically linked to herself and is unable to carry the
child to term, the use of a surrogate is the only available option.
Traditional and gestational surrogacies have significantly different
ethical and legal consequences. Many of the concerns raised in tradi-
tional surrogacy, in particular those concerning a woman contracting
to give up parental rights for her biological child, do not exist in gesta-
tional surrogacy.
Although surrogacy in some form has been around for millennia, it
has only recently caused the legal quagmire we find today. The legal
landscape has not yet caught up with the developing technologies that
allow for ever-greater reproductive options. Gestational surrogacy
was only possible following the development of IVF less than forty
years ago. While far from a common method of producing children,
this method is being used more frequently.15
III. LEGAL RESPONSES TO SURROGACY-STRENGTHS
AND SHORTCOMINGS
A. Early Judicial Responses: Baby M and Johnson v. Calvert
In many contractual arrangements, parties find themselves at odds
over how and whether they want to go forward with the agreement as
written. All states have laws and regulations governing how such dis-
putes may be resolved.16 Surrogacy agreements, like all other agree-
ments, are not immune to party discontent. In the early days of
modern surrogacy, states had few, if any, laws specifically governing
such agreements. So when disputes developed between parties, the
courts had little statutory or regulatory guidance. Two early cases, In
re Baby M17 from New Jersey in 1988 and Johnson v. Calvert" from
California in 1993, set the tone for future discussion.
14. Artificial insemination involves introducing sperm into the vagina or uterus without sexual
intercourse. This is done relatively easily with some form of syringe.
15. Accurate statistics on gestational surrogacy are not readily available. However, both the
Centers for Disease Control and SART collect data on IVF success rates. From that data we see
that the rate of gestational surrogacy nearly doubled between 2004 and 2008. MAGDALINA
GUGUCHEVA, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY IN AMERICA 4 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/KAEVEJOA1M.pdf.
16. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-209 (2011) (modification, decision, and waiver).
17. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (declaring surrogacy contracts unenforce-
able due to public policy concerns).
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These two cases, while factually distinguishable, took very different
approaches when determining whether or not to enforce surrogacy
agreements. The key factual distinction is that Baby M was born to a
traditional surrogate, 19 while the child in Johnson v. Calvert was born
to a gestational surrogate. 20 This distinction alone could explain their
differing results; however, a closer look at the opinions provides a
more fundamental explanation.
In both cases, the courts appear to recognize that contracts carry a
presumption of validity. Otherwise valid contracts should be enforced
unless they violate the law or some fundamental public policy. 2 1 In
Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that it was
against public policy for natural parents to contract "in advance of
birth which one is to have custody of the child." 22 The court also
stated "that a contractual agreement to abandon one's parental rights,
or not to contest a termination action, will not be enforced." 23 The
court went on to utterly (and properly) reject contracts that involve
baby-selling, stating that "[t]here are, in a civilized society, some
things that money cannot buy."24 These conclusions, however, rest on
the presumption that the traditional surrogate for Baby M was the
actual and lawful mother of the child. Given that presumption, the
decision is not unreasonable.25
The New Jersey Supreme Court viewed the surrogacy agreement as
an improper mechanism for circumventing New Jersey adoption stat-
18. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (holding that gestational surrogacy con-
tracts are not in violation of public policy and therefore enforceable).
19. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
20. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
21. See Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (holding that it is the role of
the courts to enforce otherwise valid contracts "unless it clearly appear that they contravene
public right or the public welfare").
22. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246.
23. Id. at 1243.
24. Id. at 1249.
25. There is, however, a reasonable argument that the Baby M decision was nonetheless mis-
guided. If the traditional surrogate is considered to be fulfilling two separate and distinct roles,
that of egg donor and that of gestational carrier, she would not be the lawful mother of the child.
Many states expressly sever any parental claim by, or parental obligation for, sperm donors. See,
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:11 (LexisNexis
1955 & repl. vol. 2010). A similar rule should be in effect for egg donors. Once the woman
donates her egg, she may no longer assert a parental claim to the child. The same is true for
sperm donors. This Article argues that gestational carriers similarly are not the child's parents
and so have no parental rights or obligations. If these two services happen to be provided by the
same woman, does that convert a legal nonparent into a legal parent? This Article does not
address that argument, focusing only on the validity and enforceability of gestational surrogacy.
Nevertheless, the distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacy is profound.
2012]1 803
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utes.26 Conversely, the California Supreme Court in Johnson v. Cal-
vert rejected any analogy to, or implication of, the adoption statutes,
stating that "[g]estational surrogacy differs in crucial respects from
adoption and so is not subject to the adoption statutes." 27 As the
agreement in question did not determine who the lawful parent was,
the adoption laws were not implicated. The court further determined
that any compensation paid to the gestational surrogate was "meant
to compensate her for her services in gestating the fetus and undergo-
ing labor, rather than for giving up 'parental' rights to the child." 28
The court stated explicitly that "[the gestational surrogate's] argument
depends on a prior determination that she is indeed the child's
mother." 29 Once the court held that the gestational surrogate was not
the lawful mother of the child, her claim collapsed. In short, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court recognized this gestational surrogacy contract
as a personal services contract and not a contract over parentage.30
Both the New Jersey and the California courts displayed a concern
regarding the potential for adverse effects on the well-being of the
parties involved in surrogacy contracts. The New Jersey court stated:
The long-term effects of surrogacy contracts are not known, but
feared-the impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that
she is the offspring of someone who gave birth to her only to obtain
money; the impact on the natural mother as the full weight of her
isolation is felt along with the full reality of the sale of her body and
her child; the impact on the natural father and adoptive mother
once they realize the consequences of their conduct. 3'
However, after reviewing the literature on these concerns, the court in
Baby M acknowledged that "given the newness of surrogacy, there is
little information." 32 This reveals a fundamental difference in ap-
proach between the courts in Baby M and Johnson. The court in
Johnson rejected the assertion that gestational surrogacy exploited
poor women because "there has been no proof that surrogacy con-
tracts exploit poor women to any greater degree than economic neces-
sity in general exploits them by inducing them to accept lower-paid or
otherwise undesirable employment." 33 It similarly rejected the con-
26. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240.
27. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776. 784 (Cal. 1993).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 786.
30. The Johnson court also utterly rejected any claim that the gestational surrogacy agreement
between Anna Johnson, the gestational surrogate, and Mark and Crispina Calvert, the intended
parents, was the equivalent of involuntary servitude. Id. at 784.
31. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1250.
32. Id.
33. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785.
804 [Vol. 61:799
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tention that surrogacy commodifies children because "no evidence
[was] offered to support it."34
The New Jersey Supreme Court and opponents of surrogacy point
to a parade of horribles and argue that we cannot risk their occur-
rence. The California Supreme Court and surrogacy proponents ar-
gue that until there is evidence that such agreements actually result in
the parade of horribles, thus proving that the agreements violate pub-
lic policy, we should not invalidate otherwise enforceable agreements.
It is a simple burden of proof argument. Opponents effectively say
that parties must prove that surrogacy does not lead to the horrible
outcomes before courts should allow it. Proponents say that courts
must have evidence that surrogacy will likely result in horrible out-
comes before courts should ban it.3
Reason suggests that the greater the potential harm, the less direct
evidence we should demand. Exploitation of women and the sale of
babies are certainly substantial harms, so perhaps we ought not de-
mand substantial evidence that they will occur if we allow the enforce-
ability of gestational surrogacy contracts. However, we should
demand at least some reasonable evidence. More than twenty years
after the availability of gestational surrogacy, we have substantial pos-
itive evidence that, even with minimal regulation, the alleged harms
have not come to pass.36 The parade of horribles that concerned the
Baby M court does not provide a justification for invalidating gesta-
tional surrogacy contracts.
B. The States' Mixed Responses
State legislatures' reactions to surrogacy agreements have varied
widely, ranging from full acceptance and enforcement of all gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements to a complete rejection of any surrogacy
arrangements enforced through criminal penalties. Some states will
enforce some surrogacy contracts, but not others; some states limit the
availability of surrogacy agreements to only certain qualified parties
(such as married couples or women incapable of carrying a fetus to
term); some states require certain provisions or prerequisites for the
enforcement of surrogacy arrangements; some states combine these
approaches. The largest group of states, however, has said virtually
nothing directly pertaining to surrogacy agreements.
34. Id.
35. Proponents also argue that, to the extent that surrogacy could result in bad outcomes, we
should only ban the practice if reasonable regulation cannot mitigate any potential harms.
36. See discussion infra Part IV.
2012] 805
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Arizona and Indiana invalidate all surrogacy agreements by stat-
ute. 3 7 In addition to declaring surrogacy agreements void, some juris-
dictions also impose civil or criminal penalties. The District of
Columbia imposes a civil penalty of up to $10,000 and a criminal pen-
alty of up to one year imprisonment on anyone who facilitates a surro-
gacy contract.38 New York imposes a penalty of up to $500 on anyone
entering into a surrogacy agreement and a civil penalty of up to
$10,000 for facilitating a surrogacy agreement in exchange for com-
pensation.39 Further, anyone in New York who assists in arranging a
surrogacy contract after already being subject to a civil penalty is
guilty of a felony.40 Michigan has the harshest penalties for entering
into or facilitating a surrogacy contract. It imposes a fine of up to
$10,000 and up to one year imprisonment for entering into a surrogacy
contract and a fine of up to $50,000 and up to five years imprisonment
for anyone compensated for facilitating a surrogacy contract. 41 Other
states refuse to enforce surrogacy agreements through judicial action.
The most notable example is New Jersey, where the New Jersey Su-
preme Court refused to enforce traditional surrogacy agreements in
the seminal case of In re Baby M.4 2
A number of states allow enforcement of only some surrogacy
agreements by statute. Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, and Virginia allow for enforcement of gestational surro-
gacy agreements if the intended parents are married. 43 Several states,
including Florida, New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, and Virginia, require
that the intended parents have a medical need for surrogacy.44 This is
generally, although not always, defined to mean that the intended
mother is unable to safely carry a child to term. Some states, includ-
ing Illinois, New Hampshire, Utah, and Virginia, require that at least
37. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2007); IND. CODE §§ 31-20-1-1 to -20-1-3 (repl. vol.
2008).
38. D.C. CODE § 16-402(b) (2001).
39. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 123(2)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2010).
40. Id. § 123(2)(b).
41. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West 2002). If the surrogate involved is an unemanci-
pated minor or has a mental or developmental disability, Michigan will impose a fine of up to
$50,000, imprisonment for not more than five years, or both on anyone else entering into the
agreement (except the surrogate herself) as well as the facilitators. Id. § 722.857(2).
42. See supra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
43. FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045(1) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 168-B:1 (LexisNexis 1955 & repl. vol. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(A) (repl.
vol. 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b) (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(3)
(LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (1950 & repl. vol. 2008).
44. FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17(II); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.756(b)(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(8).
[Vol. 61:799806
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one of the intended parents provide gametes for the creation of the
embryo.45
Some states, including New Hampshire, allow for traditional as well
as gestational surrogacy.46 Florida also allows for traditional surro-
gacy through a preplanned adoption agreement. 47 However, the
preplanned adoption agreement is subject to a right of the traditional
surrogate to rescind the agreement for forty-eight hours following the
child's birth.48 Florida bans any compensation in excess of reasonable
living, medical, legal, and mental health expenses, 49 as do Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Washington.50 A few
states prohibit compensation for any individual or entity that facili-
tates a surrogacy agreement.51
A number of states require judicial approval of any surrogacy
agreement, including New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.52
These same states also require an evaluation of the intended parents
mirror that required in adoption proceedings.53 New Hampshire spe-
cifically requires an assessment of "[t]he ability and disposition of the
person being evaluated to give a child love, affection and guidance." 54
California has the most permissive approach toward surrogacy ser-
vices, having decided in the 1993 case of Johnson v. Calvert that gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements do not conflict with the state's public
policy.55 Subsequent California cases have reinforced the Johnson de-
45. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b)(1) (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17(Il); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(5); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(9).
46. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17(IV). The New Hampshire law appears to al-
low third-party donation of sperm, as only one of the two intended parents must contribute a
gamete. Id. § 168-B:17(III). However, either the intended mother or the surrogate must provide
the egg. Thus, anonymous sperm donors are possible, but anonymous egg donors are not. This
poses an interesting, and apparently unresolved, equal protection question.
47. See FLA. STAT. § 63.213(1).
48. Id. § 63.213(2)(a).
49. Id. §§ 63.213(f), 742.15(4).
50. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045(3) (2009); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25(V); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230
(2010).
51. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(IV); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-165 (1950 & repl. vol. 2008)
(imposing a penalty equal to triple the compensation charged); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230.
52. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(I)(b); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756 (West
2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(4) (LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159(B).
53. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:18; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756(b)(3); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(3).
54. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:18(II)(a).
55. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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cision.5 6 To date, the California legislature has not seen fit to involve
itself with the question of surrogacy.
Roughly half of the states have no statutes or case law specifically
addressing surrogacy contracts. As such, it is entirely unclear how en-
forceable such contracts would be in those states. In two of those
states, there are attorney general opinions that suggest the unenforce-
ability of such contracts.57 A few other states have statutes or case
law that suggest the alternative outcome. Iowa's statute prohibiting
human trafficking (including baby-selling) explicitly excludes surro-
gacy arrangements from the definition of human trafficking.58 West
Virginia explicitly excludes fees and expenses paid to a surrogate
mother from the prohibition on the purchase or sale of a child.59 Ala-
bama explicitly excludes surrogacy from the prohibition on payment
made for placing a child up for adoption.60 These provisions may im-
plicitly condone compensated surrogacy agreements. To date, how-
ever, there are no clarifying statutes or cases.
In short, states are all over the proverbial map on surrogacy regula-
tion. This utter lack of consistency can pose a significant problem for
those wishing to engage the services of a surrogate. Few intended par-
ents with sufficient means are likely prevented from traveling to a dif-
ferent jurisdiction to utilize the services of a gestational surrogate if
they truly wish to do so. Such travel could, however, add substantially
to the transaction and legal costs. The lack of consistency artificially
limits the supply of surrogacy agencies, medical specialists, and gesta-
tional surrogates, thereby further increasing costs. More significantly
for the intended parents (and the resulting child), the radically dispa-
rate and unclear legal status from state to state raises the potential for
not knowing if the state one travels to, or through, will even recognize
the parent-child relationship. A more uniform state-by-state or fed-
eral approach would eliminate the confusion, ambiguity, and uncer-
tainty that currently exist in the provision of gestational surrogacy
services.
56. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005) (holding that each parent in a lesbian
couple could qualify as the "mother" under the Johnson intention standard); Kristine H. v. Lisa
R., 117 P.3d 690, 692 (Cal. 2005) (holding that parties who sought a judicial declaration as to
parentage may not later challenge that order); Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282
(Ct. App. 1998) (reinforcing the determination of lawful parentage when "the medical procedure
[is] initiated and consented to by the intended parents").
57. See, e.g., 85 Op. Att'y Gen. 348 (Md. 2000) (considering surrogacy agreements invalid
because they are too similar to adoption for pay); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-18 (Ky. 1981) (sug-
gesting that surrogacy agreements may violate the state's ban on buying and selling children).
58. IOWA CODE § 710.11 (2011).
59. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803(e)(3) (LexisNexis repl. vol. 2009).
60. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-34(c) (1975 & repl. vol. 2009).
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C Illinois's Statutory Approach: The Gestational Surrogacy Act
In 2004, Illinois passed its Gestational Surrogacy Act (GSA), one of
the more comprehensive statutory regimes allowing for the enforce-
ability of gestational surrogacy agreements. 61 The Illinois statute
demonstrates a good-faith attempt to meet many of the concerns re-
garding gestational surrogacy with respect to commodification and ex-
ploitation. It includes requirements for the surrogate's age,62 parity,6 3
and legal representation. 64 In addition, it requires that the surrogate
undergo complete medical and psychological evaluations.65 These re-
quirements seem to be reasonable safeguards to minimize the risk of
exploiting unsuspecting women while not preventing competent, capa-
ble, and willing women from offering gestational surrogacy services.
The GSA clearly envisions both married and unmarried couples as
intended parents. It also appears to allow single individuals to be in-
tended parents.66 This is a more expansive view than some other ju-
risdictions that allow surrogacy only for married couples, and Illinois's
legislation implicitly acknowledges that the right to procreate is not-
and should not be-a function of marital status.
The statute does have some limitations. It requires that the in-
tended parents obtain a physician's affidavit verifying a "medical need
for the gestational surrogacy." 67 However, it is unclear what is meant
by "medical need for gestational surrogacy," as the GSA does not de-
fine "medical need." A plain reading suggests that the intended par-
ents are physiologically incapable of bringing a child to term. This
may be easy to determine if one (or both) of the intended parents is
female.68 The statute is unclear regarding a single man (or a gay male
couple). He would certainly be physiologically incapable of carrying a
child to term, although he may or may not be physiologically infertile.
61. See Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1-47/75 (2010).
62. Id. § 47/20(a)(1) (requiring surrogates to be at least twenty-one years of age).
63. Id. § 47/20(a)(2) (requiring surrogates to have had at least one child prior to the
surrogacy).
64. Id. § 47/20(a)(5) (requiring that the surrogate have independent legal advice regarding the
surrogacy contract).
65. See id. H§ 47/20(a)(3)-(4), 47/60 (requiring surrogates to undergo medical and mental
health evaluations in accordance with the recommendations of the ASRM and the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists).
66. The statute defines "intended parent" as "a person or persons who enters into a gesta-
tional surrogacy contract" and goes on to add that "[i]n the case of a married couple, any refer-
ence to an intended parent shall include both husband and wife for all purposes of this Act." Id.
§ 47/10.
67. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b)(2).
68. Or perhaps not-does medical need mean physiological need, or might it include psycho-
logical or social impediments as well?
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If medical need were defined as biological infertility, no man capable
of producing viable sperm would qualify on his own.
The GSA requires that at least one intended parent provide ga-
metes. 69 The interplay of these two requirements, medical need and
provision of gametes, could effectively prevent some classes of indi-
viduals from utilizing gestational surrogacy. A single woman who has
had a radical hysterectomy 70 or lacks both a uterus and ovaries for
some other reason would be prevented from having a child through
gestational surrogacy. As would all single men. A single man who is
unable to produce viable sperm could not provide the gametes, and a
single man who could provide sperm may not have a physiological
medical need.
The GSA poses a problem for a couple (married or not) when both
partners cannot produce viable gametes. The desire to have at least
one of the intended parents contribute gametes would seem to be a
way to guard against commodifying the child and to avoid circumven-
tion of the state's adoption laws.7' When neither of the intended par-
ents provides gametes, there is less justification for choosing this route
to parenthood over traditional adoption. But that is not to say that
there are no justifications. Intended parents who cannot provide their
own gametes may still want to have a greater degree of control over
the course of the pregnancy than they could with adoption. The GSA
expressly states that a gestational surrogacy agreement is valid even if
it includes provisions that require the gestational surrogate to undergo
medical exams and fetal monitoring, or refrain from alcohol, smoking,
nonprescription drugs, and other activities. 72 The gestational carrier
may be willing to comply with the intended parents' requests regard-
ing diet or activities. No such involvement is available in the adoption
context. Intended parents who can provide neither sperm nor egg
may wish to select gamete donors that have more similar genetic his-
tories to themselves, including close relatives, than may be possible
with adoption. How common these situations are is unknown. Most
likely, the intended parents will want to use their own gametes when-
69. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b)(1).
70. A radical hysterectomy is a medical procedure in which both the uterus and the ovaries
are removed. Radical Hysterectomy, NAT'L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/dictionary?
cdrid=322879 (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
71. If a couple or an individual wished for a child to which it has no genetic connection, then
adoption may be the more reasonable route to take. Choosing surrogacy instead may otherwise
appear to be an attempt to avoid the adoption process.
72. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(d).
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ever possible. Nevertheless, we ought not foreclose the option of do-
nor gametes without good justification.73
The apparent concern for gestational surrogates in the GSA goes
beyond protecting their physical and psychological well-being. Re-
quirements that the parties undergo physical and psychological evalu-
ations prior to the agreement would sufficiently do that. There is also
a provision intended to protect the gestational surrogate's financial
interest in the gestational surrogacy agreement. If she is to receive
any compensation for her services, the compensation must be placed
in escrow prior to commencing any medical procedures. 74 There can
only be one reason for this: to protect the gestational surrogate from a
potential breach by insolvent intended parents. In essence, it ensures
specific performance by one party while disallowing it on the other.75
While specific performance by the gestational surrogate should be dis-
allowed, 76 a requirement that the intended parents fully perform at
the outset of the agreement is similarly inappropriate. It may well be
that prospective gestational surrogates demand such assurances that
the intended parents can and will provide the requisite compensation.
Intended parents may be quite willing to transfer full compensation to
an escrow agent to reassure potential gestational surrogates, but such
contractual provisions should be left to the parties to negotiate. Man-
dating their performance through law displays an unnecessary level of
paternalism by the legislature and reveals an ongoing presumption
that gestational surrogates are incapable of protecting themselves
from exploitation by unscrupulous intended parents. Until there is
evidence of frequent refusals to pay the required compensation, this is
a solution seeking a problem.
Nonetheless, despite the limitations of the GSA, Illinois took a sig-
nificant step forward in advancing the availability and enforceability
of surrogacy agreements. With some modifications, it can serve as a
good model for future legislation.77
73. For a discussion of why surrogacy is not the equivalent of adoption, see Melanie B. Jacobs,
Procreation Through ART: Why the Adoption Process Should Not Apply, 35 CAP. U. L. REV.
399 (2006).
74. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25(b)(4).
75. See id. § 47/50(b) (prohibiting specific performance as a remedy for a breach by the gesta-
tional surrogate).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981) ("A promise to render per-
sonal service will not be specifically enforced.").
77. It is interesting to note that the Minnesota legislature passed a nearly identical bill in 2008,
which was vetoed by Governor Tim Pawlenty. See Letter from Tim Pawlenty, Minn. Governor,
to James Metzen, President of the Minn. Senate (May 16, 2008), available at http://
www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/vetoes/2008veto-ch329.pdf.
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D. The Problem with California
As previously stated, California has a relatively permissive legal re-
gime with respect to gestational surrogacy. In Johnson v. Calvert, the
California Supreme Court determined that in the absence of any evi-
dence of supposed harms, gestational surrogacy does not violate pub-
lic policy78 and adopted intentionality as the determinant of lawful
parentage. 79 Subsequent courts have endorsed and expanded on the
ability to engage in gestational surrogacy contracts in California.80 In
the nineteen years since Johnson, a common practice for gestational
surrogacy agreements in California has developed. However, Califor-
nia's legal environment is entirely the result of favorable court deci-
sions without any statutory or administrative regulation or oversight.
The lack of clear regulation and oversight may lead some to seek im-
proper shortcuts resulting in the very problems surrogacy opponents
fear. Sadly, this appears recently to have happened.
In August 2011, Theresa Erickson, a San Diego attorney specializ-
ing in reproductive law, pleaded guilty to fraud charges regarding im-
proper gestational surrogacy arrangements.81  Under normal
procedures intended parents contract with gestational surrogates well
before any embryos are transferred into the surrogate. Erickson ar-
ranged for surrogates to travel to Ukraine for the transfer of donated
embryos before any intended parents were identified.8 2 The surro-
gates then returned to California to complete the pregnancy and give
birth. 3 After the twelfth week of pregnancy, when the highest risk
for miscarriage had passed, Erickson would locate couples seeking
surrogacy services. 84 She would tell the prospective parents that the
original intended parents had backed out of a (nonexistent) surrogacy
contract at the last minute.85 Those couples, believing that they would
be parents much sooner than they had previously thought, happily en-
tered into surrogacy arrangements they believed were legal and
proper.
78. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
79. See id. at 782 ("[S]he who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to
raise as her own-is the natural mother under California law.").
80. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
81. Alan Zarembo, Women Deceived in Surrogacy Scam, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 2011, at A13;
Julie Watson, Surrogacy Scandal Raises Question About Regulation, ABCNEWS.COM (Aug.
2011), http://abcnews.go.comIUS/wireStory?id=14284989.
82. Zarembo, supra note 81.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Watson, supra note 81.
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Erickson's actions are perilously close to baby-selling. Oppo-
nents-as well as supporters-of gestational surrogacy should rightly
decry what was done. However, her actions do not directly implicate
harms from enforcing gestational surrogacy agreements; the very
problem was the lack of a gestational surrogacy agreement. Nonethe-
less, opponents may argue that allowing such agreements to stand cre-
ates an environment in which unscrupulous individuals may take
advantage of the uncertain rules. The solution to individuals taking
improper advantage of uncertain rules regarding a given activity is not
to ban the activity; it is to bring certainty to those rules.86
When reasonable procedures are followed, gestational surrogacy
does not lead to any of the harms opponents trumpet.87 Erickson, it
seems, may well have taken the opportunity presented by California's
lack of clear rules for her advantage. This sad situation highlights the
need for legislative action clarifying the rules regarding gestational
surrogacy. Had a clear legal regime been in place, the intended par-
ents found post-implantation would know that the prior intended par-
ents could not renounce their parental obligations any more than
could soon-to-be parents expecting a child in the more traditional
fashion. This would give all parties, including potential surrogates, in-
tended parents, medical professionals, legal counsel, and the courts, a
far better resource for determining what is acceptable, lawful, and en-
forceable procedure for gestational surrogacy and what is not.
California has a very good judge-based set of rules for gestational
surrogacy. The state should now codify its current best practices re-
garding gestational surrogacy agreements. Such a codification would
look similar to the Illinois GSA if modified in keeping with the discus-
sion above. If federal action is not taken in the near future, the Cali-
fornia legislature should move forward and clarify its own rules.
E. The Model Acts
1. Uniform Parentage Act
In 2000, the Uniform Law Commission revised (and in 2002
amended) its Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).88 To date the UPA has
been adopted in part by several states, although few have elected to
include Article 8, the section that addresses gestational agreements.
86. Isolated incidents of unlawful baby-selling by individuals who fraudulently circumvent
standard surrogacy procedures no more lend themselves to complete prohibitions than the exis-
tence of fraudulent home mortgages would to a ban on borrowing money to buy a house.
87. See infra notes 141-203 and accompanying text.
88. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT (amended 2002), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/upa/final2002.pdf.
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UPA Article 8 allows for enforceable gestational surrogacy agree-
ments. That alone makes it a substantial improvement over the cur-
rent situation in many states. However, the UPA still contains
significant defects.
The UPA begins with faulty nomenclature. It identifies the gesta-
tional surrogate as the "gestational mother."89 The use of the term
"gestational mother" throughout Article 8 is inappropriate, as it fos-
ters the false presumption that the gestational carrier is actually the
child's mother. 90 She is not. Rather, she is the woman who carries
another couple's child to term. Inappropriately designating her as
"mother" leads to correlative defects in the UPA. The UPA should
instead use the term "gestational carrier."
The UPA then requires that "[tlhe man and the woman who are the
intended parents must both be parties to the gestational agreement." 91
This also creates an inappropriate presumption, as it would seem to
limit gestational surrogacy contracts only to opposite-sex couples.
This poses a problem for same-sex couples and for single individuals
who wish to utilize surrogacy as a means of procreation. The "man
and the woman" need not be married, but the UPA clearly envisions
only heterosexual couples.
Under the UPA, gestational agreements are only valid if they are
first submitted to a court for approval. 92 There is no need for this, and
it creates an unnecessary and burdensome step. Having a standard-
ized surrogacy agreement that is modifiable to meet individual needs
offers some advantages, but there is simply no need for judicial over-
sight prior to enforceability. 93 Court approval is not required for
other contracts dealing with what are essentially medical procedures
and personal services. It is an unnecessary burden here as well.
One potential, albeit misguided, justification for requiring judicial
approval of gestational surrogacy agreements is found in § 803 of the
UPA. Here one finds a particularly troubling aspect of the UPA.
Before a court may approve a gestational surrogacy agreement, the
relevant child welfare agency must have "[conducted] a home study of
the intended parents," ensuring that they "meet the standards of suita-
89. See, e.g., id. § 801(a).
90. With traditional surrogacy, this position may have some legitimacy; with gestational surro-
gacy, it does not.
91. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 801(b) (amended 2002).
92. See id. § 801(c).
93. Enacting regulations mandating certain provisions to be in (or excluded from) a surrogacy
agreement may be appropriate, but requiring both specific provisions and judicial oversight is
unnecessary.
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bility applicable to adoptive parents." 9 4 It ties directly back to the
false presumption found in the terminology of "gestational mother."
This requirement raises the implication that gestational surrogacy is
the equivalent of adoption. 9 5 If gestational surrogacy were the same
as adoption, then prior court approval, with a home visit, may be justi-
fied. However, the analogy is fundamentally flawed.
In adoption, the concern is whether the state should transfer paren-
tal rights and obligations from one person (or the state) to a particular
individual or pair of individuals. The state has an interest in making
sure it has not made a poor choice and placed a child in harm's way.
This is not what is happening in gestational surrogacy. The intended
parents already have the rights and obligations as parents of the re-
sulting child irrespective of the gestational agreement. This is true
even under the UPA itself, which provides that the intended parents
may be subject to child support even without an approved
agreement.9 6
The adoption analogy only holds up if the state is in fact transfer-
ring parental rights and obligations from the gestational carrier to the
intended parents. By this logic should not all people using ART be
required to have a home study? There is a contract between the ART
provider and the intended parents whenever medical intervention is
utilized. How does surrogacy change this? Not because there is an
eventual child involved who must be protected. That is true of all
forms of ART. Surrogacy only falls under the logic of adoption if we
presume that the gestational surrogate is the actual and lawful parent
of the child. If we accept that the intended parents are the lawful and
actual parents of the child from the moment of the child's per-
sonhood, complete with all the rights and obligations of parenthood,
then adoption is inapplicable.
UPA § 806 allows for termination of the gestational agreement by
any party to the agreement, provided that such termination occurs
prior to the gestational carrier becoming pregnant pursuant to the
agreement.97 This provision is not problematic. However, § 806 goes
on to relieve the gestational carrier and her husband of any liability to
the intended parents for the termination. 98 Immunity from liability is
not similarly granted to the intended parents. There is little justifica-
94. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 803(b)(2) (amended 2002). This provision may be waived by
the court. Id.
95. The official comment to § 803 makes this analogy explicit. See id. cmt., at 73.
96. Id. § 809(c) (imposing on the intended parents the obligations of child support irrespective
of the gestational surrogacy agreement's validity).
97. Id. § 806(a).
98. Id. § 806(d).
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tion offered for this asymmetry. If the surrogate or her husband may
hold the intended parents liable for any uncompensated loss or harms
resulting from a breach, so too should the intended parents be able to
hold the gestational carrier (or her husband) liable for loss or harms
resulting from a breach. The only justification for this asymmetry is a
presumption that there is such an imbalance in bargaining power be-
tween the gestational carrier (and her husband) and the intended par-
ents that we should allow the presumptively weaker party to disavow
an otherwise valid agreement-one already approved and validated
by a court-with no liability. This presumption has no merit. 99
UPA § 807 allows the intended parents to petition the court for an
order confirming that they are the parents of the child and ordering
that the child be surrendered to the intended parents. 00 However,
the intended parents may not file the petition until after the child is
born.'01 There is no reason to disallow the intended parents to peti-
tion the court for a prebirth order. Allowing the parties to clarify the
parental status of the child while it is still in utero is far more conve-
nient than waiting until the frenzied days following the child's birth.
UPA § 802 contains a residency provision requiring that at least one
of the parties be a resident of the state for ninety days before petition-
ing a court to approve the surrogacy agreement. 102 This provision is
expressly intended to prevent forum shopping. 03 It is uncertain why a
state, accepting of gestational surrogacy, should want to prevent non-
residents from accessing such services. There appear to be three plau-
sible reasons: (1) a desire not to have its courts swamped with
nonresidents' petitions for validating gestational surrogacy agree-
ments; (2) a desire not to offend or interfere with other states' public
policies; or (3) a desire not to facilitate residents of other states trying
to escape their home state's restrictive or uncertain laws. The first
reason would disappear if, as this Article proposes, there were a na-
tional standard. The matter of forum shopping would be moot. Fur-
ther, elimination of judicial pre-approval of surrogacy agreements,
along with clear guidelines for such agreements, would dramatically
reduce the need for any court involvement. The second reason does
not seem to apply in other contexts. States routinely use their laws to
attract businesses and jobs from other states. The third reason does
99. See infra notes 141-67 and accompanying text.
100. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 807(a)(1)-(2) (amended 2002).
101. See id. § 807(a).
102. Id. § 802(b)(1).
103. Id. cmt., at 72.
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not seem to be a legitimate concern. The conduct of New Jersey's
residents is not a matter for California to regulate.
In sum, Article 8 of the UPA is a good-faith attempt to address the
growing practice of gestational surrogacy. It takes a number of steps
forward and would help clarify the law for many states. However, it
has several shortcomings. Much like Illinois's GSA, the UPA could be
a reasonable model for states to adopt with modification.
2. ABA Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technologies
The American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated the Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology in 2008.104 The Model
Act contains two alternative approaches to the enforceability of surro-
gacy agreements: Alternative A and Alternative B. 05 Alternative A
closely follows the model of the UPA and imposes nearly identical
requirements for enforceable gestational surrogacy agreements, in-
cluding residency requirements of the parties,to 6 judicial pre-
approval, 0 7 "home study of the intended parents,"108 and asymmetry
in liability for early termination of the agreement. 109 For all the rea-
sons discussed with respect to the UPA, Alternative A falls short.
One additional aspect of the judicial approval required under the
UPA and Alternative A is that the court has independent discretion
regarding whether or not to approve the agreement even if all the
statutory requirements are met. 10 There is little reason to give the
court such discretion. The courts' role, if there even is one, should be
limited to ensuring that the requirements of the statute have been
met. Once the court has made that determination, it ought not have
an additional veto power over the surrogacy agreement. Such power
allows for identically situated parties to be treated differently under
the law depending on the whim of the presiding judge. The drafters of
the Model Act recognized this potential. In an article explaining the
Model Act, Steven Snyder and Charles Kindregan wrote that this
"gives the presiding judge discretion as to whether to approve any
104. MODEL Ac-r GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (Proposed Official Draft 2008),
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
105. Id. art. 7 (Legislative Note).
106. See id. § 702(2)(a) (Alternative A).
107. See id. § 701(3).
108. See id. § 703(2)(b).
109. See id. § 706(4).
110. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 803(a) (amended 2002); accord MODEL ACT GOVERNING
AsSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 703(1) (Proposed Official Draft 2008) (Alternative A) ("If the re-
quirements of subsection (b) are satisfied, a court may issue an order validating the gestational
agreement .... " (emphasis added)).
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agreement, thereby creating at least the possibility that similarly situ-
ated parties in front of two differently inclined judicial officers may
receive different results in their approval process for no apparent or
substantive reason.""' They do not, however, explain the rationale
for this discretion. Both the UPA and Alternative A use "shall order"
language elsewhere. 112 If judicial pre-validation is to be maintained,
both Acts should be amended to read "if the requirements of this Act
are satisfied, the court shall issue an order validating the gestational
agreement." 13
On the positive side, both Alternatives A and B use more appropri-
ate nomenclature, identifying the surrogate as the "gestational car-
rier" rather than, as in the UPA, a "gestational mother." This sets a
more accurate tone for the relationship among the parties.
The key difference between Alternatives A and B (and how Alter-
native B differs from the UPA) is that Alternative B allows for self-
executing agreements without any requirement for prior judicial ap-
proval. 114 This alone makes it the much more attractive alternative.
Alternative B does, however, have its own shortcomings.
Alternative B is very similar to the Illinois GSA. The two have sim-
ilar eligibility requirements for the surrogate." 5 She must (1) be at
least twenty-one years old; (2) have given birth to at least one child;
(3) have completed a medical evaluation relating to the expected
pregnancy; (4) have completed a mental health evaluation related to
being a gestational carrier; (5) have independent legal counsel; and (6)
have medical insurance to cover her until at least eight weeks follow-
ing delivery of the child. 116 Like the Illinois GSA, Alternative B also
requires that the intended parents have a medical need for surrogacy
services,' 17 that at least one of the intended parents provide gametes
111. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of AR T: The New
American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM.
L.Q. 203, 222 (2008). At the time of their article's publication, Snyder was the chair of the ABA
Section of Family Law Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Committee, which promulgated
the Model Act Kindregan held the position prior to Snyder.
112. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE Ac-r § 807 (amended 2002); MODEL ACT GOVERNING As-
SISTED REPROD. TECH. § 707 (Proposed Official Draft 2008) (Alternative A).
113. Interestingly, the Proposed Model Act from 2006 does state that "[t]he court shall vali-
date a gestational agreement within thirty (30) days of the filing of the petition" if the agreement
is in compliance with the Act. See PROPOSED MODEL ACr GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD.
§ 604(2) (2007), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelcode-feb
2007.pdf.
114. See MODEL AcT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 703(1) (Proposed Official
Draft 2008) (Alternative B).
115. See id. § 702.
116. Id. § 702(1).
117. Id. § 702(2)(b).
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for the embryo,118 and that they have a mental health evaluation per-
taining to the agreement. 119 Alternative B contains similar provisions
regarding clauses required in the gestational agreement. 120 Like the
Illinois GSA, Alternative B denies specific performance by the gesta-
tional carrier for a breach of the agreement.121 Unlike the Illinois
GSA, however, Alternative B does allow for all other remedies at law
or equity for breach by either party.122 There are, in fact, few differ-
ences between the Illinois GSA and Alternative B with respect to the
validity and enforceability of gestational agreements. To the extent
that they are the same, Alternative B carries all the same shortcom-
ings as the Illinois GSA. 123
There is one key distinction between the Illinois GSA and the
Model Act (applying to both Alternative A and Alternative B). The
Illinois GSA defines gestational surrogacy as when "a woman at-
tempts to carry and give birth to a child . . . to which the gestational
surrogate has made no genetic contribution." 124 The Model Act de-
fines the gestational carrier as a woman "who enters into a gestational
agreement to bear a child, whether or not she has any genetic relation-
ship to the resulting child."1 25 The Model Act thereby explicitly al-
lows for both traditional and gestational surrogacy, while the Illinois
GSA allows only for gestational surrogacy. This is a somewhat con-
troversial approach by the ABA. Many state courts, state legislatures,
and commentators find a distinction between traditional and gesta-
tional surrogacy, such that they warrant disparate treatment.
F. The International Option: Outsourcing Gestational Surrogacy Is
Not the Answer
In an attempt to avoid the legal prohibitions and uncertainties
found in many states, as well as to seek a less costly option, many
intended parents travel overseas to find surrogacy services. Interna-
tional surrogacy, however, is problematic and fraught with risk.
118. Id. § 702(2)(a).
119. Id. § 702(2)(c).
120. See MODEL Acr GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 703(3) (Proposed Official
Draft 2008) (Alternative B).
121. Id. § 709(2).
122. See id. § 710.
123. See supra notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
124. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/10 (2010).
125. MODEL Acr GOVERNING AssiSTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(16) (Proposed Official Draft
2008).
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India has become a viable option and is a frequent destination for
those seeking international surrogacy services.126 Even so, it presents
its own set of limitations. India's own Baby M case-Baby Manji-
provides a cautionary tale.12 7 In November 2007, Ikufumi and Yuki
Yamada, a Japanese couple, contracted for surrogacy services in India,
using an egg donor and a gestational surrogate.128 Baby Manji was
born in late July 2008.129 Unfortunately, during the pregnancy, the
Yamadas divorced, and Mrs. Yamada ceased to be involved.130 Be-
cause Baby Manji was not born to a Japanese mother, the Japanese
embassy in India declined to grant her a passport.131 Indian law was
silent on surrogacy, and a 120-year-old law prohibited single men from
adopting baby girls.132 This posed a problem for the now-single Mr.
Yamada. Eventually, the Indian Supreme Court resolved the issue in
favor of Mr. Yamada, and he was able to take his daughter home. 133
Since the Baby Manji situation, Indian lawmakers have proposed
draft bills addressing surrogacy and other reproductive technolo-
gies.134 To date, these bills have not been enacted into law.
India has also posed additional challenges for intended parents. In
2010, Myleen and Jan Sjodin of Toronto, Canada faced unexpected
difficulty after their child was born to an Indian surrogate.135 The
Sjodins reported that the physician dramatically raised her fees prior
to the child's birth and used India's bureaucracy to delay their return
to Canada.136
The rise of India as a destination for surrogacy services can lead to
abuses. "'Today, unfortunately, even the smallest clinics are doing
surrogacy because it's a simple procedure and four times as profitable'
as other fertility treatments, said Dr. Aniruddha Malpani, a fertility
specialist in Mumbai. 'Some aren't up to the mark, and foreigners get
126. See Amelia Gentleman, India Nurtures Business of Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2008, at A9.
127. For a full discussion of the Baby Manji situation, see KARI POINTs, KENAN INST. OF
ETHICS AT DUKE UNIV., COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AND FERTILITY TOURISM IN INDIA: THE
CASE OF BABY MANJI (2009), available at http://www.duke.edu/web/kenanethics/CaseStudies/
BabyManji.pdf.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. PoINTs, supra note 127, at 6-7.
134. See Nishat Hyder, India Debates New Surrogacy Laws, BIONEWS (Feb. 7, 2011), http://
www.bionews.org.uk/page 88796.asp.
135. Mark Magnier, A Bundle of Joy with Baggage, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, at Al.
136. Id.
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fleeced."1 37 Despite these problems, India remains a popular desti-
nation for international surrogacy. A number of agencies in the
United States specifically advertise surrogacy services available in In-
dia.138 India is not the only international destination for intended par-
ents. Ukraine has also become an increasingly popular location for
international surrogacy services. It, too, carries risks for the intended
parents.139
International surrogacy raises another troubling ethical dilemma.
While surrogacy services are not inherently exploitative, 140 there re-
mains a potential for exploitation. Factors that could potentially lead
to exploitation are more prevalent in countries where poverty is more
widespread and women possess less political, economic, and social
control over their own lives. We have the capacity to ensure that ges-
tational surrogacy services are safe and that legal questions as to the
status and relationships among the parties are clear from the outset.
Prohibiting gestational surrogacy in the United States only serves to
encourage intended parents to travel to countries where gestational
surrogates have fewer legal and social protections.
IV. ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION AND WHY THEY FAIL
Opponents of surrogacy as a reproductive option raise a number of
seemingly valid arguments. These arguments fall into a few broad cat-
egories: surrogacy has the potential to commodify or exploit the surro-
gate; surrogacy has the potential to harm children by commodifying
them; surrogacy is tantamount to baby-selling; surrogacy confuses pa-
rental status; children born through surrogacy may have developmen-
tal or psychosocial difficulties growing up; and surrogacy is an attempt
to circumvent adoption statutes. Each of these concerns has, at first
blush, an apparent degree of legitimacy. On closer inspection, how-
ever, none of these arguments hold up. Each is either founded on
misplaced presumptions or proved by the actual evidence following
years of experience to be unfounded.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., SURROGACY ABROAD INC., http://www.surrogacyabroad.com (last visited Nov.
29, 2011) (based in Chicago, Illinois); WEECARE PARTNERS USA, http://www.weecaresurrogacy.
corn (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (based in Plainwell, Michigan).
139. See Claire Bigg & Courtney Brooks, Ukraine Surrogacy Boom Not Risk-Free, RADIO
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (June 4, 2011), http://www.rferl.org/content/womb-for-hire
ukraine surrogacy.boomisnotriskfree/24215336.html.
140. See infra notes 141-78 and accompanying text.
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A. Are Surrogates Commodified or Exploited?
In Margaret Atwood's dystopian, science fiction novel, The Hand-
maid's Tale, fertile women are treated as commodities and serve as
surrogate mothers for the elite of society.141 These women are treated
like breeding stock and have no rights or freedoms. Atwood's novel
reads as a cautionary tale as to what can go very wrong with surro-
gacy. Interestingly, this fictional novel was first published in 1985, just
before events leading to the case of Baby M took place. The Hand-
maid's Tale is, in part, a depiction of the parade of horribles envi-
sioned in that case.
The Handmaid's Tale depicts a fictional future, but real-world argu-
ments that surrogacy unethically commodifies or exploits women have
been with us for some time. In 1988, the court in Baby M was quite
concerned about the potential commodification of surrogates and the
buying and selling of their services.142 In 1990, Elizabeth Anderson
made a forceful argument that a contract for surrogacy services ren-
ders the surrogate as little more than a commodity.143
The argument that surrogacy commodifies the gestational carrier
rests on the notion that she is paid for her services, that something is
being bought and sold. With respect to commodification of the surro-
gate, that "something" is the surrogate herself. If taken literally this is
a patently false argument. The woman, herself, is not bought or sold;
she is not selling herself. She is providing a service and being paid for
it.
But opponents are not making a literal claim that the surrogate is
bought and sold. Rather, it is that the services of her body are being
bought and sold. Surrogacy, in this respect, is sometimes compared to
prostitution.144 On a superficial level, there is a similarity. In both
situations a woman is exchanging the services of her body to another
141. See MARGARET ATwooD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986).
142. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988).
143. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 71 (1990). Professor Anderson reiterated her argument ten years later in Why Commercial
Surrogate Motherhood Unethically Commodifies Women and Children: Reply to McLachlan and
Swales, 8 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 19 (2000).
144. See, e.g., Lisa L. Behm, Legal, Moral & International Perspectives on Surrogate Mother-
hood: The Call for a Uniform Regulatory Scheme in the United States. 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 557, 578 (1999); Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile
Women or a Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 158
(1997); Amy M. Larkey, Note, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in Gesta-
tional Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 614 (2003).
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for money.145 However, the analogy to prostitution falls apart under
closer scrutiny. Prostitution is used for the sexual gratification of the
patron, nearly always with the fervent hope that a child not be the
result. Gestational surrogacy, on the other hand, involves no sexual
gratification for anyone and carries the fervent hope that a child will
result. Prostitution does not involve the uterus; surrogacy does. In
prostitution, the body is the service; in surrogacy, the body is merely
the vessel through which the services are rendered.
Prostitution and surrogacy are, in actuality, two very different
things. True, throughout most of human history, there has been and
continues to be a rather close link between the sexual act and the
gestation of a child.146 There is logic in the argument that when one
activity (such as the exchange of sexual services for money) is banned,
any inextricably linked activity (such as gestational surrogacy for
money) should also be banned. This could apply to traditional surro-
gacy before the advent of IVF. However, in the current situation, sex-
ual intercourse and the gestation of the fetus have been completely
disconnected. The discussion as to whether prostitution should be
lawful, but regulated, is left for others to debate. The fact remains
that prostitution and surrogacy are fundamentally different, both in
process and purpose. Any conclusion that prostitution is unethical,
harmful, and illegal and therefore gestational surrogacy is also unethi-
cal, harmful, and illegal is logically misplaced. Any such argument as
to why prostitution should be disallowed cannot be automatically ap-
plied to gestational surrogacy. 147
Even if a surrogate has not been commodified, is she not exploited
nonetheless? It may be argued that the gestational surrogate places
herself at great risk for the benefit of someone else. It has been ar-
gued that the great majority of gestational surrogates are substantially
of lower socioeconomic status than the intended parents.148 On their
own, these facts do not prove exploitation.
145. This does not explain the objection to uncompensated gestational surrogacy. Indeed,
some states have chosen to enforce uncompensated surrogacy agreements while prohibiting
compensated surrogacy. See supra notes 49-50.
146. It is certainly true that the surrogate agrees to provide a rather intimate service. The
physical intimacy, however, is not with the intended parents. It is with the developing fetus. The
intended parents and the surrogate contract for the services she provides.
147. It is also true that some sincerely held religious beliefs hold that sexual intercourse
should only be done within the context of procreation. That is not the reality for most people.
Those practicing such religions should not be allowed to impose their religious beliefs on the
remainder of a secular society.
148. See, e.g., Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the
Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOzo L. REv. 497, 524 (1996).
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There are many occupations, jobs, and services that involve a sub-
stantially greater risk to the lives and well-being of the individuals per-
forming those activities. Active-duty military personnel, miners, fire
fighters, police officers, and fishermen come to mind.149 Are the men
and women who perform these valuable services exploited? Were
pregnancy deemed an "occupation," its fatality rate of 12.1 per
100,000 pregnancieso50 would not even make it into the top twenty-
five most dangerous occupations.' 5  Further, the pregnancy fatality
rate accounts for all pregnant women. If it were to only include
women who had planned pregnancies after being prescreened for any
health risks and who received early and ongoing prenatal care, the
rate would undoubtedly be lower.
It is not the offering of compensation that renders something ex-
ploitation; it is not whether individuals would perform such tasks ab-
sent financial compensation. We offer military recruits signing
bonuses and college tuition. Are soldiers exploited? 152 It is not that
they put their life at risk. Many professions involve placing one's
physical well-being at risk. We often make heroes out of those that
put themselves at risk to help others. Some individuals become fea-
tured in popular television shows because they put themselves in sig-
nificant danger to keep diners well supplied with Alaskan king crab.15 3
It is a question of whether the individual is compelled by circum-
stances to accept a level of risk they would not otherwise take in order
to gain a benefit that most would consider far too meager to justify the
inherent risk. Put another way, is the risk-compensation ratio much
149. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the ten civilian occupations with the highest
fatality rate per 100,000 full-time equivalents in 2009 were fishers (203.6); loggers (65.5); aircraft
pilots and flight engineers (59.0); farmers and ranchers (39.7); roofers (34.7); structural iron and
steel workers (30.3); refuse and recyclable material collectors (26.5); driver/sales workers and
truck drivers (20.2); construction laborers (18.8); and industrial machinery installation, repair,
and maintenance workers (18.5). BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NUM-
BER AND RATE OF SELECTED OCCUPATIONS WITH HIGH FATAL INJURY RATES 19 (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0008.pdf.
150. See NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., VITAL
AND HEALTH STATISTICS: MATERNAL MORTALITY AND RELATED CONCEPTS 1 (2007), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_03/sr3_033.pdf.
151. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJU-
RIES, TOTAL HoURS WORKED, AND RATES OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES FOR CIVILIAN
WORKERS BY SELECTED WORKER CHARACTERISTICS, OCCUPATIONS, AND INDUSTRIES, 2009
(2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfoi-rates_2009hb.pdf.
152. Young men and women regularly provide the services of their bodies to protect, defend,
and kill for America. They do so at the risk to their own lives and health. Is it not just as noble
to provide the services of your body to help bring another life into the world as it is to provide
the services of your body to defend life and country?
153. See Deadliest Catch (Discovery Channel) (more information available at http://
dsc.discovery.com/tv/deadliest-catch).
824 [Vol. 61:799
BE FRUITFUL AND MULTIPLY
higher than an ordinary person would willingly accept absent the coer-
cive effects of desperation?
So what does constitute exploitation in the context of surrogacy?
That question is directly addressed by Stephen Wilkinson in his arti-
cle, The Exploitation Argument Against Commercial Surrogacy.154
Wilkinson argues that surrogacy is exploitative, but that banning it
would only drive the women into more exploitative work. Hence, it is
better to allow and regulate surrogacy services, thereby reducing the
overall risk of exploitation of the women involved. 55
Wilkinson first defines what he considers to be exploitation. He
identifies two possible situations that could result in exploitation: (1)
circumstances in which the distribution of harm and benefit between
the two parties is unjust and (2) circumstances in which the party pos-
sibly being exploited has not validly consented. 156 This is a not an
unreasonable definition of exploitation. However, Wilkinson comes
to the wrong conclusion when he applies it to gestational surrogacy.
The question of distribution of harm and benefit often comes down
to whether the individual is adequately compensated for the risks and
burdens she takes. Are gestational surrogates underpaid? That is a
difficult question to answer with any certainty. How do we know if
someone is paid a fair wage for his services? 5 7 Wilkinson rightly ar-
gues that underpayment as an argument is problematic. Any potential
underpayment can be resolved through regulation that mandates
higher compensation.15 8 Free-market advocates would likely want to
let the law of supply and demand determine the appropriate level of
compensation. To be exploitation, must there be some facet of surro-
gacy that renders it impossible to pay a fair price? Wilkinson raises
and rejects this aspect of surrogacy as exploitation.159
What is the appropriate level of payment for compensated gesta-
tional surrogacy? Currently the going rate for a first-time surrogate is
154. Stephen Wilkinson, The Exploitation Argument Against Commercial Surrogacy, 17
BIOETHICS 169 (2003).
155. See id. at 186.
156. Id. at 173.
157. One calculation sometimes made is whether compensation for gestational surrogacy
meets minimum wage. See, e.g., Kerian, supra note 144, at 164. There are approximately 6,400
hours in the average human pregnancy. At the current minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, that
would total $46,400. That is roughly double what the average first-time surrogate is directly
compensated for gestational services. Of course, pregnant women are able to engage in other
activities during the majority of the time they are pregnant.
158. Wilkinson, supra note 154, at 180.
159. See id. at 180-81. He does hold out the possibility that surrogacy cannot be fairly com-
pensated if it is regarded as "baby-selling." Id. For a discussion of baby-selling, see infra notes
179-81 and accompanying text.
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in excess of $20,000.160 Surrogacy contracts generally also contain
provisions for compensation for lost wages, child care, travel, house-
keeping, and clothing allowances, as well as additional and separate
compensation for each procedure performed. 161 The adequacy of that
rubric would change for different individuals. Wealthier individuals
would not likely work at the local fast food establishment for $15 per
hour, even though that may be well above the going rate.
Still, arguments of exploitation often center around the belief that
surrogates are more likely poor and intended parents are more likely
well off. Commentators have raised concern that gestational surro-
gates tend to be poor and of ethnic minorities, while intended parents
tend to be affluent and white.162 It may well be true that gestational
surrogates tend to come from ethnic minorities of lower socio-
economic status. Such facts may certainly raise a question of potential
exploitation. They do not, however, answer it. To constitute exploita-
tion, there needs to be something more.
Wilkinson recognizes that the employment argument could just as
easily apply to "poorly paid cleaning work, or factory work, or prosti-
tution."1 63 He then says that one distinction "is the thought that [sur-
rogacy] is particularly harmful, especially psychologically, because of
the close relationship between women and their offspring." 164 Wilkin-
son seems to accept this distinction as valid. Based on this supposed
harm, opponents generally think that surrogates cannot be compen-
sated fairly and that women only agree to serve as gestational surro-
gates because they feel coerced. 165 This is a misguided concern, as
there is no evidence that the great majority of surrogates are psycho-
160. For example, first-time surrogates through Growing Generations, a gestational surrogacy
agency located in Los Angeles, California, are paid $22,000. Surrogate Fee Information, GROW-
ING GENERATIONS, http://www.growinggenerations.com/surrogacy-program/surrogates/financial-
information (last visited Aug. 14, 2011). First-time surrogates through Surrogacy Specialists of
America, a gestational surrogacy agency located in Houston, Texas, are paid between $15,000
and $25,000. Surrogacy Costs, SURROGACY SPECIALISTS OF AM., http://www.ssa-agency.com/de-
fault.aspx?meniitemid=120 (last visited Aug. 14, 2011). First-time surrogates through Sunrise
Surrogacy Solutions, a gestational surrogacy agency located in southern California, are paid be-
tween $24,000 and $26,000. Costs, SUNRISE SURROGACY SOLUTIONS, http://www.sunrisesurro-
gacy.com/ip-costs.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2011).
161. See, e.g., GROWING GENERATIONS, SURROGATE BENEFIT PACKAGE-GESTATIONAL
SURROGACY (2010), available at http://www.growinggenerations.com/content/pdflSurrogate
BenefitPackage 6 1_1590.pdf.
162. See, e.g., Angie Godwin McEwen, Note, So You're Having Another Woman's Baby: Eco-
nomics and Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 277 (1999).
163. Wilkinson, supra note 154, at 183.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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logically harmed. There is little evidence that even a substantial mi-
nority of surrogates are psychologically harmed.166
Interestingly, although Wilkinson seems to conclude that surrogacy
is exploitative, he does not conclude that it should be banned. Rather,
he argues that it should be properly regulated to minimize whatever
exploitive nature it may have. 167 On the point of effective regulation,
I wholeheartedly agree. Perhaps the most effective means of minimiz-
ing potential exploitation is to ensure full disclosure of the potential
risks and complications of being a gestational surrogate, as well as ad-
equate screening procedures and independent social and legal
counsel.
An appropriate level of regulation could help to ensure more-equal
bargaining positions between the gestational surrogate and the in-
tended parents. The concern is that the gestational surrogate not be
negotiating from a position of weakness. Arguably, however, it is the
intended parents who are in the weaker position at the bargaining ta-
ble. It is gestational surrogates' services that are the rate-limiting step.
There are three essential components in the full process of gestational
surrogacy: (1) obtaining gametes; (2) finding medical professionals ca-
pable of handling the necessary medical procedures; and (3) finding a
gestational surrogate to carry and deliver the child.
If they use their own gametes, the first component poses no diffi-
culty for the intended parents. If they must use donor gametes, this
too poses little difficulty (absent the legal impediments created by
some jurisdictions). Sperm donors are readily available. Egg donors
can be more problematic but are not difficult to locate. As to the
second component, willing medical professionals are easily found in
virtually any reasonably large metropolitan area. The most difficult
part is the third component. Finding a surrogate willing and able to
commit to this process is the most difficult part of the process. As
such, the reality is that the intended parents need the surrogate much
more than the surrogate needs the intended parents.
B. Psychological Effects on the Surrogate
One of the concerns raised by the court in Baby M is the psycholog-
ical effect surrogacy may have upon the surrogate herself.168 Oppo-
166. See infra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
167. See Wilkinson, supra note 154, at 186. Wilkinson makes the argument that depriving
these women of the opportunity to perform surrogacy services will only drive them into more
exploitative and more harmful options. Id. The better approach is to allow surrogacy but regu-
late it more effectively.
168. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1247-48 (N.J. 1988).
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nents fear that if the surrogate is required to give up the child she
carried for nine months and to which she grew emotionally attached,
she would be at substantial risk for potentially severe, adverse psycho-
logical consequences. If this fear is substantiated, it could be a legiti-
mate justification for restrictive legislative action, potentially even
banning the practice. Several articles have been published in the psy-
chological literature over the past several years looking precisely at
this question. Thus far, they have found no adverse consequences.
In 2004, R.J. Edelmann looked at the then-available literature re-
garding the psychological issues resulting from surrogacy.169 Profes-
sor Edelmann found that the available literature provided a picture
"of surrogates, motivated largely by altruism, who establish good rap-
port with the commissioning couple, and have little difficulty separat-
ing from children born as a result of the arrangement, with the
children themselves subsequently showing good adjustment." 17 0 This
conclusion does not offer much scientific support for the view that
surrogates are at significant risk for psychological trauma.
In 2005, Janice Ciccarelli and Linda Beckman added to the discus-
sion with a further review of the psychological and social science liter-
ature on surrogacy."'7 Their review of the literature confirmed
Edelmann's finding that surrogates are primarily motivated by altruis-
tic concerns. 172 This is not to suggest that financial considerations do
not play a substantial role in their decisions to become surrogates, but
it runs counter to the notion that they are being exploited. Further,
Ciccarelli found that surrogates are quite satisfied with their roles and
experiences as surrogates even five and ten years after giving birth.173
Additional studies support Edelmann's and Ciccarelli and Beck-
man's conclusions. The Centre for Family Research at Cambridge
University has done considerable work looking into, among other
things, the psychosocial effects of various forms of ART on the people
involved. In 2003, Dr. Vasanti Jadva published a study looking di-
rectly at the effects of surrogacy on the surrogate herself.174 Dr. Jadva
169. See generally R.J. Edelmann, Surrogacy: The Psychological Issues, 22 J. REPROD. & IN-
FANT PSYCHOL. 123 (2004).
170. Id. at 133. Edelmann, however, did acknowledge that the available literature was limited
and that researchers should conduct further studies. Id.
171. See generally Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An
Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. Soc. IssUEs 21 (2005).
172. Id. at 30.
173. Id. at 31.
174. See generally Vasanti Jadva et al., Surrogacy: The Experiences of Surrogate Mothers, 18
Hum. REPROD. 2196 (2003). Dr. Jadva is now a Research Associate at the Centre for Family
Research.
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found that, "[o]verall, surrogacy appears to be a positive experience
for surrogate mothers." 75 Rather than experiencing psychological
problems, "surrogate mothers often reported a feeling of self-
worth."17 6 This is not to say that there were no difficulties. While
none of the surrogates reported "experienc[ing] any doubts or difficul-
ties whilst handing over the baby," there were some surrogates (32%)
who reported some difficulty in the weeks following delivery.'77 How-
ever, within a few months that number fell to only 15%, and by one
year after delivery 94% of surrogates reported no difficulties.' 78
The weight of evidence now available argues strongly that women
are capable of accurately assessing their psychological suitability to
serve as gestational surrogates. A small number of surrogates appear
to experience some minimal psychosocial difficulties, but the great
majority appear to do quite well. Gestational surrogacy is certainly
not suitable for all women, just as not all women (or men) are suited
to be coal miners, nurses, or combat soldiers. Most of those who
choose to become surrogates do not suffer from the psychological
trauma that opponents of surrogacy describe. If anything, this evi-
dence suggests a possible need for minor regulatory requirements re-
garding proper informed consent and careful evaluation of potential
surrogates. It does not argue for a complete ban.
C. The Misguided Concern for the Child
1. Commodification of the Child
Is the child being bought and sold? That is the underlying question
here. But first a distinction must be drawn between a traditional sur-
rogate and a gestational surrogate. With traditional surrogacy, the
surrogate is agreeing to make no claim of parental rights over a child
that is genetically her own. With gestational surrogacy, the child has
no genetic connection to the surrogate, thus greatly attenuating any
potential claim of parentage.
But is a child really being sold? Not literally. Technically, it is not
the child that is being "bought and sold." The child is not "owned" by
anyone.179 What is really being argued is that the parental rights and
obligations with respect to the child are being bought and sold. While
this may be a distinction without much of a practical difference, it
175. Id. at 2203.
176. Id. at 2204.
177. Id. at 2200.
178. Id.
179. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution makes literal ownership of children, or
anyone else, unconstitutional in the United States. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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does, however, change the nature of the argument. The claim of baby-
selling, then, rests on the premise that the surrogate is agreeing to
transfer her parental rights and obligations to someone else in ex-
change for some consideration. This, in turn, raises the question of
whether the surrogate actually has parental rights and obligations.
This Article argues that she does not, at least with respect to gesta-
tional surrogacy.180
In both traditional and gestational surrogacy, the intended father is
neither buying nor selling parental rights. The child is his regardless
of who is determined to be the proper mother. The intended father
has the same rights and obligations he would have if he produced the
child in the more conventional fashion. The only question is whether
the woman who provided the egg is buying parental rights and obliga-
tions from the woman who provided the services of carrying the child
to term.
So, is the surrogate selling her parental rights and obligations?
With compensated surrogacy, money is certainly changing hands. Two
facts are clear: (1) the intended parents pay the gestational surrogate a
substantial amount of money and (2) the gestational surrogate agrees
to carry the embryo to term and to make no claim of parental rights
over the child. The juxtaposition of the payment of money and the
formal surrender of any potential legal claim of parentage can easily
lead to the conclusion that the surrogate is giving up her parental
rights in exchange for money. Some commentators have looked at
these bare facts and concluded that they can only mean that a baby is
being sold.181 But is that the actual nature of the transaction? To an-
swer that question, we must first ask whether the gestational surrogate
has parental rights and obligations to sell. If she has none, then she
must be "selling" something else.
2. A Question of Parentage
Is the gestational surrogate a mother who gives up her parental
rights, or was she never the mother at all, without any parental rights
to give up? If the former, this may be a problem. If the latter, then
the money is for something else. It is not for giving up the child; it is
for the service of carrying the child for nine months. We do not say
that a day-care provider is "giving up" a child entrusted to him for the
180. A similar argument can be made in traditional surrogacy. However, it requires some
additional analysis. See supra note 25.
181. See, e.g., Bryn Williams-Jones. Commercial Surrogacy and the Redefinition of Mother-
hood. 2 J. PHIL.. Sci. & L. § 4.1 (2002), available at http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/archives/
papers/comsur.williamsjones.html.
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day. We do not say that a nanny is "giving up" a child entrusted to her
for a week or more while the parents are on vacation. Nor do we say
that the headmaster of a boarding school is "giving up" a child at the
end of the school term. No, they are returning to the parents a child
entrusted to their care. This is precisely what the gestational surro-
gate is doing as well.
But is there not something more intimate with respect to gestating a
fetus than there is with providing babysitting services? Of course, but
that is a difference of degree. The fundamental starting place is to
determine to whom the child belongs. It remains uncontroversial that
the embryo does not belong to the surrogate prior to transfer into her
uterus.182 That would be considered a rather absurd argument. The
embryo belongs to the individuals who created it.
Whether the embryo is mere property or holds personhood status
is, however, relevant to the surrogacy question. If embryos are mere
property, then a concern regarding commodification of the embryo
certainly seems warranted. Property is, almost by definition, com-
moditized. If the embryo is property, it becomes a commodity to be
bought and sold. As the embryo becomes the baby, one is in effect
buying and selling the baby. This fear is misplaced. Whether the em-
bryo is deemed property or person, the implications for gestational
surrogacy are nonexistent. The end result is the same.
Let us first assume, for the sake of argument, that embryos are
properly categorized as property. Prior to transfer to the gestational
surrogate, the embryos are the property of the intended parents and
are produced from the intended parents' own gametes.18 3 At what
point did the intended parents transfer their property rights to the
surrogate? There is no express transfer of such rights. In fact, the
expressed intention of the parties is quite the opposite. There is no
abandonment. The intended parents certainly want back the property
they entrusted to the surrogate; that is the very essence of the agree-
ment. If anything, the surrogate has a bailment over the embryos
182. The status of the embryo remains controversial. Whether embryos hold personhood sta-
tus or are mere property has significant implications in determining how they should be handled,
what may be done with them, and the rights and obligations of the embryos' progenitors. The
seminal case discussing this question is Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). The Davis
court concluded that embryos are neither persons nor property. Id. at 597. Rather, they are
something in between. Id. This "splitting of the baby" is not entirely satisfying and does not
fully address the difficulties inherent in excess embryo production. While this is an interesting
and as-yet-unresolved debate, it does not speak to whom the embryos belong.
183. There is an added analytical wrinkle when donor sperm or eggs are used. But legally, this
should provide no significant obstacle. The intended mother provides the egg. either her own or
one donated to her by a third party. The intended father provides the sperm, either his own or
donated from a third party.
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(subject to the terms of the bailment agreement).'18 4 There is no other
form of property transfer taking place. If there is no transfer of prop-
erty, then the consideration being paid to the gestational surrogate
cannot be in exchange for the embryo as property.
If we next assume that the embryo has personhood status, then the
embryo must have parents from the moment it is created. The only
candidates for parenthood are the intended parents who provided the
gametes. The intended parents are the legal parents before the em-
bryo is ever transferred into the surrogate. The medical procedure
that transfers the embryo into a surrogate's uterus cannot transfer le-
gal parental rights. We should no more transfer parental rights to the
surrogate than we would a long-term caregiver in a boarding school.
In short, the intended parents are the parents before, during, and after
the embryos are within the surrogate's uterus.
As shown, the property-personhood status dichotomy is only tan-
gentially relevant here. Regardless of the embryo's status before, dur-
ing, or immediately after transfer, it certainly does gain personhood
status at some point during gestation. By the time of its birth, that
embryo has become a baby. As a baby, it absolutely qualifies as a
person. Whether the intended parents were the "owners" of an em-
bryo or the "parents" of an embryo, they are now the parents of a
baby.
But the status dichotomy is still relevant. If the embryo is a person,
then the answer is clear. The intended parents were the parents at the
beginning and they remain so at the end. In this situation, the surro-
gate cannot be considered to be selling her parental rights; she has no
parental rights to sell. However, if the embryo were property, then
even embryos conceived in the usual fashion would be property. At
some point in development, the embryo transitions from property to
personhood. At that point, the embryo becomes a baby with parents.
There are two possible pathways. Either the intended parents, as the
owners of the embryo, themselves transition into parents or the surro-
gate becomes the parent of the newly formed child and the intended
parents' legal connection is snuffed out.
If, as the Davis court would have it, embryos are neither property
nor persons, the remaining problem is nearly identical to the situation
in which they are considered property.185 There must be a point
184. Under a bailment theory, the surrogate has a duty to keep and protect the embryo for
the duration of the bailment and a duty to transfer possession back to the rightful "owners" at its
conclusion.
185. Although most courts looking at the property-personhood divide take the Davis route of
designating embryos as something in between, as a practical matter, they tend to treat embryos
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reached during the gestation at which time the embryo transitions
away from being a property-person hybrid to fully become a person.
As with the pure property analysis, one must ask, who then are this
new person's parents? The most reasoned approach would look to
the "owner" of the property aspect and who is the "parent" of the
person aspect of the embryo. As the intended parents fill both of
these roles, it is no great twist of logic to recognize the intended par-
ents as the undisputed parents of the resulting baby.
Regardless of how we characterize the embryo prior to implanta-
tion, it does become a child with parents. But the question remains:
Does it become the child of the surrogate or of the intended parents?
This is a potentially profound and difficult question. Is a woman a
mother because she gestates the fetus, or is she a mother because she
is the genetic progenitor? With respect to the father, there is no ques-
tion. He is the father by virtue of being the genetic progenitor.
Should there be a different standard between men and women?
Clearly men and women play a different role in the creation of a child,
but that is not really the question here. The question is whom the law
should recognize as the legal parent.
The problem stems from a dual definition as to who qualifies as the
lawful mother. The UPA identifies the mother as the woman who is
the genetic progenitor or the woman who "give[s] birth to the
child."l 86 In the vast majority of cases, they are the same woman.
Until the advent of IVF, they were always the same woman. IVF and
gestational surrogacy change this reality. 87 Faced with two women
having competing claims as to motherhood, jurisdictions must either
determine which definition of motherhood should prevail or prevent
the situation from ever occurring.
To resolve the dilemma, California looks at the intentions of the
parties involved."' If the parties intended the genetic progenitor to
be the mother, then she should be recognized as the lawful mother.
The gestational carrier would simply be that-the woman who pro-
as if they were property. The general view seems to be that if the parties who create the em-
bryos have a contract designating what will happen to the embryos, that contract will be
honored. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that an agreement, if there
is one, should control the distribution of cryopreserved embryos); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d
261 (Wash. 2002) (holding that the contract, if one exists, should govern control and dispensation
of the embryos). Respecting the contract, even when it calls for the destruction of the embryos,
treats the embryos more like property than persons.
186. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 201(a) (amended 2002).
187. The UPA recognizes this change by including Article 8, which deals with surrogacy ar-
rangements. See id. at art. 8.
188. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993).
2012] 833
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
vided gestational services for the intended couple. 189 Alternatively, if
the parties intended the carrier to be the mother, then the carrier
would be the mother and the genetic progenitor would, effectively, be
an egg donor.
If we accept the determination that any child resulting from a gesta-
tional surrogacy agreement is lawfully the child of the intended par-
ents from the very beginning of the process, there can be no actual or
perceived commodification of the child. Gestational surrogacy is sim-
ply another mechanism by which parents have children. No one is
actually buying or selling the child. No private contracting transfers
parental rights. The resulting child is the child of the intended parents
regardless of any agreement they may have with the gestational surro-
gate. The gestational surrogacy agreement is, as it should be, only an
agreement regarding the surrogate's services as a gestational carrier
for the child and nothing more.
This is not baby-selling. It could only be baby-selling if the gesta-
tional surrogate were the lawful mother and she exchanged her baby
for money. If the child is not hers, then she has nothing to sell. Any
payment she receives can only be in compensation for the valuable
services she provides: gestational services. It is true that the intended
parents will often ask the surrogate to sign papers surrendering any
claim she may have on the child. This, however, is only a result of a
"belt and suspenders" approach to contracting and a presumption
that, in the absence of any other evidence, the woman who gives birth
to a child is considered the child's parent. Here, there is ample evi-
dence to utterly refute that presumption. Asking the gestational sur-
rogate to acknowledge an existing legal reality in writing is hardly
baby-selling.
3. But What About the Kids?
One of the primary concerns of those opposed to surrogacy involves
the potential harms that may be visited upon the children.190 For the
past several years, Professor Susan Golombok of Cambridge Univer-
sity has been researching this very question. Professor Golombok has
been conducting a longitudinal study of surrogacy families and com-
paring them with a control group of natural-conception families. The
189. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Suzanne F. Seavello, Are You My Mother? A Judge's Decision in In Vitro Fer-
tilization Surrogacy, 3 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 211, 219-20 (1992).
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first, second, and third installments looked at the families one year, 191
two years,192 and three years' 93 after the child's birth, respectively.
The fourth, and most recent, installment in this ongoing research
looks at the families when the child is seven years old and was recently
published in Developmental Psychology.194
Professor Golombok's findings are illuminating and put to rest any
serious notion that surrogacy poses any potential or meaningful risk of
harm to the families or the resulting children. Far from leading to
harmful effects early in childhood, Golombok found that surrogacy
families have a greater degree of psychological well-being than
natural-conception families.195 Professor Golombok specifically refer-
ences the concerns of surrogacy raised by the court in Baby M and
concludes that "[t]he findings of the present study do not support
these negative assumptions with respect to the child's 1st year of
life." 196
The positive family dynamic and positive child development contin-
ued at age two. The parents of children born through surrogacy even
seemed to do marginally better than parents of naturally conceived
children.197 With respect to the children, Golombok concludes:
In spite of the concerns that have been raised regarding the in-
creased risk of psychological problems among children born
through a surrogacy arrangement, the children in the present inves-
tigation did not differ from the naturally conceived children with
respect to socio-emotional or cognitive development.198
At least through age two, children born through surrogacy appear to
do every bit as well as children born through the more conventional
method.
The findings at age three bring an important addition. By age three,
forty-four percent of the parents had begun discussing with their chil-
191. See generally Susan Golombok et al., Families Created Through Surrogacy Arrangements:
Parent-Child Relationships in the Ist Year of Life, 40 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 400 (2004)
[hereinafter Golombok I].
192. See generally Susan Golombok et al., Surrogacy Families: Parental Functioning,
Parent-Child Relationships and Children's Psychological Development at Age 2, 47 J. CHILD
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 213 (2006) [hereinafter Golombok II].
193. See generally Susan Golombok et al., Non-Genetic and Non-Gestational Parenthood:
Consequences for Parent-Child Relationships and the Psychological Well-Being of Mothers, Fa-
thers and Children at Age 3, 21 Hum. REPROD. 1918 (2006) [hereinafter Golombok III].
194. See generally Susan Golombok et al., Families Created Through Surrogacy: Mother-Child
Relationships and Children's Psychological Adjustment at Age 7, 47 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
1579 (2011) [hereinafter Golombok IV].
195. Golombok I, supra note 191, at 408.
196. Id. at 409.
197. Golombok II, supra note 192, at 219.
198. Id. at 220.
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dren that they were born through surrogacy.199 This seems to have
little impact on the children's well-being, as children born through sur-
rogacy continued to do just as well as naturally conceived children. 200
Children born through surrogacy showed continued normal devel-
opment as compared to naturally conceived children seven years fol-
lowing birth. The only difference found at age seven was a somewhat
less positive mother-child relationship in surrogacy than natural con-
ception.201 Nevertheless, Golombok "emphasiz[es] that the children
were functioning well, with no differences identified according to fam-
ily type by the mother or the child's teacher." 202 Golombok concludes
saying that, "[o]verall, the findings indicate that these families con-
tinue to function well in the child's early school years and are more
similar than they are different." 203 In short, children born through
surrogacy experience essentially the same level of psychosocial devel-
opment as children born through natural conception. The feared ad-
verse effects on the children have not significantly materialized.
Simply put, the kids are alright.
D. Scholarly Objections to Gestational Surrogacy and Why They
Fall Short
A number of scholars have written critically of the practice of surro-
gacy. Professor Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, for example, wrote an
impassioned argument against surrogacy that typifies much of the
scholarly arguments in opposition to surrogacy and the enforceability
of surrogacy agreements. 204 Professor Browne-Barbour makes and
summarizes many of the arguments in opposition to the enforceability
of surrogacy agreements, including several of the ones already dis-
cussed. Among her arguments are (1) the "best interests of the child,"
rather than contract, is the appropriate analysis for determining child
custody;205 (2) surrogacy is tantamount to slavery or peonage; 206 (3)
procreative liberty does not include the use of a gestational carrier;207
(4) freedom of contract does not include surrogacy agreements; 208 and
199. Golombok III, supra note 193, at 1921.
200. Id. at 1922.
201. The reverse findings existed for ages 1, 2, and 3, when a more positive relationship was
found in surrogacy families. See Golombok IV, supra note 194, at 1585.
202. Id. at 1586.
203. Id. at 1587.
204. See generally Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception
Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429 (2004).
205. See id. at 439-43.
206. See id. at 467-68.
207. See id. at 468-70.
208. See id. at 470-71.
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(5) surrogacy is nothing more than baby-selling. 209 Each of these ar-
guments comes up short.
First, Professor Browne-Barbour argues that such agreements must
be assessed using the best interests of the child analysis.210 However,
she does not adequately address the question as to why the best inter-
ests analysis should trump other considerations. To support her argu-
ment, she discusses the prevailing law regarding the transfer of legal
custody from one lawful parent to another in the adoption or divorce
contexts.211 Professor Browne-Barbour reasonably argues that in
such circumstances, jurisdictions require a best interests analysis and
will decline to enforce prior agreements between the parents.212
While Professor Browne-Barbour's analysis is sound as far as it
goes, it relies on an invalid assumption. Her analysis presumes that
the circumstances inherent in surrogacy are the equivalent of the cir-
cumstances found in adoption or divorce. They are not. In adoption
or divorce there is an existing child whose interests the court must
protect. Absent an enforceable surrogacy agreement, there is no child
to protect. Inherent in her argument is an assumption that the surro-
gate is a lawful parent of the child she carries. Certainly in the context
of gestational surrogacy, this is a faulty assumption.213
Her argument raises a fundamental question: Why should the best
interests of the child be the determinative and exclusive factor when
determining the validity of a surrogacy contract? Even if we decide
that it should, why does a surrogacy contract inherently fail this test?
Absent the surrogacy agreement, the particular child in question
would not exist. Is it in the better interest of the resultant child to
exist or not to exist?214
Best interests aside, Professor Browne-Barbour then argues that
"[a] more compelling argument for banning [surrogacy] arrange-
ments" is that they "are merely baby-selling contracts that violate fed-
eral laws and, thus, are void and unenforceable." 2 15 She goes on to
equate surrogacy with slavery and says that surrogacy agreements vio-
209. See id. at 471-74.
210. Browne-Barbour, supra note 204, at 439-43.
211. See id. at 441-43.
212. See id. at 441.
213. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text. The argument is more compelling, albeit
not dispositive, with respect to traditional surrogacy because the surrogate is a genetic progeni-
tor of the child.
214. This is not to say that the best interests of the child cannot be a factor. It simply is not a
valid argument for declaring all surrogacy agreements null and void from the outset.
215. Browne-Barbour, supra note 204, at 467.
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late the Thirteenth Amendment and federal anti-peonage statutes.216
While Professor Browne-Barbour makes this assertion, she offers no
explanation as to why surrogacy is tantamount to slavery. The gesta-
tional carrier is hardly being bought and sold. She is providing a valu-
able and honorable service to the lawful parents. Likewise, there is no
involuntary servitude-the surrogate is not being compelled by force
to accept transfer of an embryo. There is nothing involuntary about
gestational surrogacy. The prospective gestational surrogate volunta-
rily agrees to the procedures and to provide gestational services in
exchange for the agreed-upon compensation. The argument of slav-
ery only works if the surrogate is coerced against her will. This rests
on a presumption of exploitation. As discussed above, surrogates are
not exploited. 217 Without the exploitation prop to rest upon, the slav-
ery argument falls apart.
Similarly, a gestational surrogacy agreement does not constitute pe-
onage. The United States Code defines peonage as "[t]he holding of
any person to service or labor ... in liquidation of any debt or obliga-
tion." 218 Surrogacy does not qualify under this definition of peonage.
At no time is the surrogate being held in labor in satisfaction of a
debt. She is providing an ongoing service in exchange for ongoing
payment. The only reasonable link to peonage is that a surrogate,
once pregnant with a viable fetus, may not terminate the pregnancy.
However, this inability is not a function of the surrogacy agreement
itself.219 It is a function of independent prohibitions and limitations
on abortion. Further, if this qualifies as peonage, then so too must
babysitting-a babysitter may not abandon the child placed in his
care.
Professor Browne-Barbour correctly states that the United States
Supreme Court has not yet determined whether procreative liberty
includes the use of a gestational surrogate.220 However, the lack of a
Supreme Court decision expressly and overtly affirming a particular
right does not mean that the government may interfere with otherwise
valid good-faith agreements premised upon other grounds.
Browne-Barbour appears to accept the general argument that free-
dom of contract would suggest, at least initially, that otherwise valid
agreements entered into in good faith should be respected. She then
216. See id. at 467-68.
217. See supra notes 141-67 and accompanying text.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006).
219. It may or may not be that contractual obligations to continue carrying the fetus prior to
fetal viability could violate anti-peonage statutes. If so, such provisions within a surrogacy agree-
ment would be unenforceable without rendering the remaining provisions null and void.
220. Browne-Barbour, supra note 204, at 469-70.
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asserts, correctly, that "[f]reedom of contract, however, is not abso-
lute."221 Freedom of contract does not apply to "contracts that are
illegal, void, or violate public policy." 2 2 2 While contracts contrary to
public policy are properly unenforceable, she offers unconvincing rea-
sons as to why surrogacy arrangements violate public policy. She as-
serts that they are personal services contracts and therefore
unenforceable. 223 She equates gestational services to slavery, citing
the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on involuntary services as a
"primary reason[ ] that the law finds personal contracts to be unen-
forceable." 224 However, it is not that the personal services contract is
unenforceable; it is that specific performance is not available as a rem-
edy for a breach of such contracts. A provision in a gestational surro-
gacy agreement that precluded an otherwise lawful abortion may well
be unenforceable as an invalid specific performance clause in a per-
sonal services contract. That, however, is a far cry from a conclusion
that the entire contract must be declared void and unenforceable.
Finally, she asserts that "[surrogacy] agreements are merely baby
selling devices that commodify women and babies." 225 Gestational
surrogacy in no way involves the buying or selling of anyone. The
child is, from its conception, the product of the intended parents. The
very title of her article, Bartering for Babies, carries this flawed as-
sumption. The intended parents and the potential surrogate are not
bartering over the baby. They are bartering over the surrogate's ser-
vices in carrying the intended parents' baby to term.
Ultimately, Professor Browne-Barbour rests her argument on the
notion that some "things are not for sale." 2 2 6 That is correct. What is
incorrect is her assertion that gestational surrogacy involves the selling
of a baby or of a gestational surrogate. It does not. The baby in ques-
tion is the child of the intended parents from the time it is conceived.
The intended parents cannot be purchasing that which is already
theirs. Nor can the gestational surrogate be selling that which is not
hers. 2 2 7 The surrogate is not enslaved. She is providing a valuable
service for individuals who very much want a child. In short, the argu-
ments against gestational surrogacy rest on the presumption that the
221. Id. at 470.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 471.
226. Browne-Barbour, supra note 204, at 485; see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227. 1249 (N.J.
1988) ("There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy.").
227. More precisely, the intended parents are not purchasing, nor is the gestational surrogate
selling, the right to be the child's parents.
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gestational carrier is a lawful parent of the resulting child, that she is
being exploited by the intended parents, or that the child is being
commodified. Each of these presumptions is without foundation.
Professor Browne-Barbour raises one last concern regarding the
long-term welfare of the children that are born through surrogacy.
She is legitimately concerned with potential adverse impacts on the
child's social and cognitive development.228 At the time of her writ-
ing, she could find no long-term studies looking into the psychosocial
effects of surrogacy on the child. We now have such studies, and they
reveal no adverse effects.229
Bryn Williams-Jones is another prominent opponent to surrogacy
contracts. Williams-Jones argues that surrogacy fragments mother-
hood. 230 This too may be a potential concern, but only if the surrogate
is considered a "mother" to the child. Here, again, a distinction must
be drawn between traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy.
With traditional surrogacy, Williams-Jones raises a potentially legiti-
mate concern. Traditional surrogates are both the genetic progenitor
and the gestational carrier of the child.231 This is not the case with
gestational surrogacy. With gestational surrogacy, the carrier's only
connection to the child is having carried the embryo to term. That is
hardly an insignificant contribution, to be sure; however, does that
alone constitute motherhood? The argument that gestational surro-
gacy "fragments" motherhood requires us to accept both that carrying
the embryo to term is an essential aspect of being a "mother" and that
it alone is sufficient to be deemed the "mother." It suggests that a
woman who does not carry the child, but who nurtures and raises the
child after birth, can achieve nothing more than a fractured mother-
hood.232 However, motherhood (and indeed, fatherhood) is some-
thing more than just the biological act of conceiving and giving birth.
It involves primarily the responsibility for, and the act of, raising the
child in the years following birth. 233
228. See Browne-Barbour, supra note 204, at 483.
229. See supra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
230. Williams-Jones, supra note 181, § 3.1.
231. However, even this does not necessarily constitute the fracturing of the status of mother-
hood. One must come to terms with the reality that modern science has altered the assumptions
of how one becomes a parent. Until recently, it was only through biology or legal adoption.
ART is challenging those methods as the only paradigms.
232. Are all adoptive mothers fractured? One might also ask that even if we assume a frac-
tured motherhood, is that necessarily a bad thing? Or might having multiple individuals as po-
tential "mothers" actually be advantageous?
233. See, e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicat-
ing Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341 (2002); Melanie B.
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One may ask, when does the woman "become" the mother? When
does the man "become" the father? A wife does not often tell her
husband that she is pregnant by saying, "Honey, you are a father."
No, she more often says, "Honey, you are going to be a father." This
bit of common human behavior suggests that parenthood begins, in
most peoples' minds, at the birth of the child.2 3 4 Surrogacy does not
fracture motherhood. It is merely another means of achieving
motherhood.
E. Other Arguments
1. Religious, Moral, and Ethical Objections
In the end, there is a divergent view of morality and legality. Much
of the remaining opposition to surrogacy stems from a subjective view
that this sort of practice is inherently immoral. It does not matter
whether any specific feared outcomes actually occur. A practice that
is on its own morally wrong should, arguably, be disallowed regardless
of the potential for any secondary harms.235 This position often stems
from sincerely held religious beliefs. The Catholic Church has long
opposed any form of technological interference with the reproductive
process.236
Such moral objections need not have empirical data of any actual
harms to support them. But resting the argument on moral disap-
proval raises an important question as to the role of government in
the regulation of practices that only some members of society find
morally objectionable. The State should not prohibit any conduct
merely because a minority (or even a majority) finds it morally objec-
Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIz. ST. L.J. 809
(2006).
234. Other sections of this Article argue that the intended parents should be considered the
parents of the resulting child even before embryo transfer. This is not inconsistent. Rather, it is
a recognition of the reality that legal status and social status are not always the same thing.
235. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Render unto Caesar that Which Is Caesar's, and unto God
that Which Is God's, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 495 (2008) (arguing that it is appropriate for
governments to legislate morality and that we should prosecute perpetrators of victimless
crimes).
236. The Catechism of the Catholic Church § 2376 states:
Techniques that entail the dissociation of husband and wife, by the intrusion of a
person other than the couple (donation of sperm or ovum, surrogate uterus), are
gravely immoral. These techniques (heterologous artificial insemination and fertiliza-
tion) infringe the child's right to be born of a father and mother known to him and
bound to each other by marriage. They betray the spouses' "right to become a father
and a mother only through each other."
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2376 (2d ed. 1997) (citing CDF, Donum vitae II, 1).
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tionable.237 Justice Kennedy, when addressing the sincerely held be-
lief by some that homosexuality is immoral, said:
For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and
deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which
they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives.
These considerations do not answer the question before us, how-
ever. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the
State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation
of the criminal law. "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all,
not to mandate our own moral code." 238
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the argument that mere moral
disproval may justify government intervention. Without some accom-
panying demonstrable harm that the State has an interest in minimiz-
ing, the State ought not prohibit any arguably immoral activity. As
discussed above, no such accompanying harm has been demonstrated.
2. Why Not Just Adopt?
It can be argued that people ought not be allowed to utilize surro-
gacy services when there are thousands of babies and children availa-
ble for adoption. 239 The argument distills down an assertion that it is
morally and ethically wrong to have children in this way while so
many other children have no parents. While this may be true, it is also
irrelevant. Or rather, the argument applies just as well to couples hav-
ing children in the traditional way. Contraception is easy, inexpen-
sive, and effective. Why not adopt rather than having one of "your
own"? The couple planning to have a child through the traditional
method is making the same choice as the couple utilizing surrogacy.
In both cases the parents are choosing to have a child that is geneti-
cally linked to themselves rather than to adopt an unrelated child. In-
terference in that choice is not the province of the government.
It is, of course, considerably less expensive to conceive a child the
old-fashioned way as compared to adoption (or surrogacy). But when
compared to the costs of raising a child to adulthood, the marginal
cost of adoption is not so dramatic.240 Further, to even make such an
237. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding
that moral disapproval alone does not constitute a legitimate state interest).
238. Id. at 571 (majority opinion) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 850 (1992)).
239. See, e.g., Elisabeth Eaves, Not the Handmaid's Tale, FORBES.COM (Dec. 19, 2008. 12:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/18/kuczynski-surrogacy-motherhood-oped-cx-ee
1219eaves.html (addressing the claim that intended parents "are often told that they are selfish
and should instead adopt a needy child").
240. The cost of raising a child to age seventeen is estimated to be $206,180 for lower-income
families, $286,860 for middle-income families, and $477,100 for upper-income families. This esti-
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argument is to implicitly commodify the child. This argument boils
down to choosing traditional conception over adoption because it is
cheaper.
3. To Compensate or Not to Compensate?
A number of commentators have raised the argument that surro-
gacy, if it is to be permitted, should only be uncompensated and altru-
istic. 2 4 1 Indeed, a number of states, including Washington, Nebraska,
and Florida, have enacted laws that prohibit compensated gestational
surrogacy.242 In those states, gestational surrogates may not be com-
pensated for the service they provide in excess of reasonable expenses
and medical care associated with the pregnancy itself. The primary
argument appears to be the fear of exploitation. The promise of large
sums of cash induces poor women to provide a risky service they
would never otherwise consider. 243 The logic seems to be that if we
remove the financial lure we will protect the women from making un-
wise agreements.
Williams-Jones seems particularly concerned regarding compen-
sated surrogacy:
Remuneration is the most problematic aspect of surrogacy because
it challenges the cultural ideals of women and mothers as selfless
nurturers; admitting that remuneration was adequate would elimi-
nate the ability of the women to classify their work as an altruistic
"gift of life" to an infertile couple. 244
One might ask what this means for nannies and au pairs who certainly
accept remuneration in exchange for nurturing the children in their
care. It is quite possible for women to feel that they are providing an
altruistic "gift of life" while at the same time accepting compensation.
The majority of gestational surrogates interviewed held precisely this
view. Even while accepting compensation, they felt their primary mo-
tivation was one of altruism. 245 Accepting compensation, it seems,
does not undermine the kinder, gentler reasons many women wish to
be gestational surrogates.
mate does not include prenatal costs or any expenses after age seventeen, including any college
costs. MARK LINO, CTR. FOR NUTRITION PoL'Y & PRomoroN, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EXPEND-
ITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIES, 2010 (2011), available at http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publica-
tions/CRC/crc2010.pdf.
241. See, e.g., Ailis L. Burpee, Note, Momma Drama: A Study of How Canada's National
Regulation of Surrogacy Compares to Australia's Independent State Regulation of Surrogacy, 37
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305. 322 (2009).
242. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
243. See Browne-Barbour, supra note 204, at 476.
244. Williams-Jones, supra note 181, § 3.1.
245. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 171, at 30.
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Although many gestational surrogates consider altruism to be a sig-
nificant motivating factor 246 and many commentators view the com-
pensation aspect to be so very troubling, not all believe that altruism is
necessarily a good thing in this context. Some have argued that even
encouraging potential gestational surrogates to think of the service
they provide in altruistic terms, rather than economic terms, works to
the gestational surrogates' disadvantage. 247 Altruism itself is a form
of compensation that serves to reduce the monetary amount needed
to encourage a sense of adequate consideration in the mind of the
gestational surrogate. 248 The merits of this argument remain some-
what theoretical. As commercial gestational surrogacy gains wider ac-
ceptance and practice, however, whatever concern this may bring will
likely diminish.
In the end, the reality is that gestational surrogates do, in fact, pro-
vide a valuable service on behalf of the intended parents and the
hoped-for child. They accept a significant amount of responsibility
and do so at some risk to themselves. It is only right and proper that
they should be compensated for their efforts. 249
V. THE PATCHWORK APPROACH CREATES HARMS AND
RESOLVES NONE
The patchwork quilt that is our states' laws on surrogacy has re-
sulted in significant hardships for many individuals, while failing to
meet the goals that local enactors hope to accomplish. Restrictions on
surrogacy are intended to protect surrogates from exploitation, pro-
tect children from commodification, and avoid circumvention of adop-
tion laws. Surrogates are not exploited, children are not commodified,
and adoption is inapplicable. The individual state laws discouraging
surrogacy do not protect against any of these harms because gesta-
tional surrogacy does not create any of these harms. The inconsistent
and uncertain approach to surrogacy across the country, unfortu-
nately, does create harm.
Refusing to enforce gestational surrogacy agreements in various
states, or even imposing criminal penalties, has certainly not stopped
the practice. Intended parents and potential surrogates either go for-
246. See Edelmann, supra note 169, at 133.
247. See Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Uni-
formity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 300, 303 (2007).
248. See id.
249. The appropriate magnitude of the compensation is a question best left to the parties to
decide. Governmental regulation may, of course, set reasonable parameters to ensure that the
amount is not exploitative or unconscionable. But if $1,000 is too low an amount, mandating
that it be $0 is certainly worse.
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ward regardless of the law or seek friendlier jurisdictions. Numerous
examples can be found of individuals who utilize surrogacy despite the
legal uncertainty.
In New Jersey, despite the unenforceability of surrogacy agree-
ments following the Baby M case eighteen years earlier, a gay male
couple (lawfully married in California) asked one of their sisters to
serve as a gestational carrier. Following the birth of twin baby girls,
the sister refused to surrender the children to them and petitioned the
court to recognize her parental rights notwithstanding the gestational
surrogacy agreement. 250 The couple may have felt that Baby M invali-
dated traditional surrogacy, thereby leaving open the possibility for
the enforceability of a gestational surrogacy agreement. Judge Francis
B. Shultz, the trial judge, did not see a distinction between traditional
and gestational surrogacy. He wrote:
"The surrogacy contract is based on, principles that are directly
contrary to the objectives of our laws. It guarantees the separation
of a child from it's [sic] mother; it looks to adoption regardless of
suitability; it totally ignores the child; it takes the child from the
mother regardless of her wishes and her maternal fitness." Would it
really make any difference if the word "gestational" was substituted
for the word "surrogacy" in the above quotation? I think not.251
Whether the New Jersey Supreme Court will take this as an opportu-
nity to limit its decision in Baby M to traditional surrogacy or to ex-
pand its decision to all forms of surrogacy remains unknown. The
New Jersey appellate courts have yet to consider this case.
Virginia allows for uncompensated surrogacy (traditional and gesta-
tional), but limits the practice to married heterosexual couples. 252 A
same-sex couple contracted with a woman to act as a traditional surro-
gate. The relationship between the couple and the surrogate wors-
ened over time and geography. The couple moved multiple times to
and from both North Carolina and California. Eventually, the Vir-
ginia court accepted the North Carolina judgment granting the same-
sex couple full legal and physical custody. 253
Even in Michigan, a state that bans and imposes criminal penalties
for engaging in surrogacy agreements, the practice persists. A married
couple, Scott and Amy Kehoe, sought the services of Laschell Baker
250. See A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009) (unpub-
lished opinion).
251. Id. at 5 (citation omitted) (quoting In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (N.J. 1988)).
252. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (1950 & repl. vol. 2008).
253. See Prashad v. Copeland, 685 S.E.2d 199 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
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as a gestational surrogate. 254 She agreed and some time later gave
birth to twins.255 After initially surrendering the children to the
Kehoes, Ms. Baker filed an action to take the children back and
won.256
This uncertainty poses great risk to the individuals involved, not
least of all the children born through surrogacy. Intended parents and
surrogates move and travel. Uncertainty regarding the law inhibits
this ability. There are substantial added economic, legal, and social
costs resulting from the disparate and uncertain laws. As we see in
these examples, laws blocking the enforcement of surrogacy agree-
ments do not tend to prevent the practice. They only serve to gener-
ate more uncertainty and more child-custody disputes. The supposed
solution to imagined harms does nothing more than generate mote
confusion and distress.
Gestational surrogacy is a reasonable alternative for individuals and
couples who cannot have children through more traditional methods
and who, for whatever reasons, do not wish to utilize adoption. There
is no demonstrated harm to the gestational surrogates, the intended
parents, or the resulting children. What has generated the most legal
and social angst is the wildly disparate and uncertain legal landscape
the people involved face.
The solution to this is obvious. We need to create a more uniform
approach to gestational surrogacy services. This can be achieved
through widespread adoption of Alternative B, modified so as to ad-
dress the shortcomings identified above. Better yet, we should adopt
a federal gestational surrogacy act with essentially the same provi-
sions. A federal approach would achieve uniformity more quickly,
and it would obviate any forum shopping within the United States. 257
A federal approach would also bring all states into agreement with
regard to the relationship status of children, intended parents, and ge-
stational surrogates, greatly reducing the difficulties of all parties
when one or the other of them moves between jurisdictions taking
wildly different approaches.
254. See Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, with Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009,
at Al.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. There may still be some who would take the international route, but a uniform legal
regime in the United States would make domestic gestational surrogacy preferable with respect
to the legal implications. International surrogacy would then compete on the basis of price.
Intended parents would be faced with a choice of potentially lesser cost or legal certainty.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A gestational surrogate provides a noble service that should be
respected and honored. She helps in the creation of life, bringing into
the world a child who otherwise would not exist. She is not coerced or
compelled into this service. She does place herself at some risk, but
she does so knowingly, willingly, and without reservation. Why this
should not be honored is mystifying.
Almost eighty years ago, Louis Brandeis said that the states are the
laboratories of democracy.258 To the extent that this is true, we must
also recognize that the time comes when a given laboratory experi-
ment is over. We have been experimenting with the recognition of
surrogacy contracts since before Baby M over two decades ago. Since
that time several states have allowed gestational surrogacy to grow as
a reproductive option. Thousands of women have served as gesta-
tional carriers and given birth to thousands of babies, making
thousands of intended parents immeasurably happy (and sleep de-
prived). We have seen virtually no evidence of adverse consequences.
The women do not feel exploited. The children have not become
commoditized. They grow and develop with the same sorts of
problems and blessings as any other children. None of the adverse
consequences posited by opponents in the early (or later) years of the
experiment have come to pass. It is time to declare the experiment
over and recognize the social value this practice offers for infertile
people nationwide.
258. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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